Not in Newberry Auckland

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AN ESSAY UPON FRIENDSHIP,

From the Ingenious

Monſieur *de Sacy's*,

Lately Publiſh'd.

In Three Parts.

The Firſt Directs us in the Choice of our Friends.

The Second in our Behaviour towards 'em.

The Third in our Conduct, when the Union is Diſſolv'd by Death or Otherwiſe.

With ſome Alterations.

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THE

PREFACE.

IF it were not the Faſhion to beſpeak the Reader's Favour; we ſhou'd venture this Author abroad upon the ſtrength of his own Merit. His Buſineſs being with Men of Virtue and Honour, there's no fear of a Candid Acceptance. The Choice of his Subject will recommend him to be read; and we hope the Juſtice he has done it obtain their Approbation. He muſt be allow'd to have done Service if he has come up to his Deſign, of im-

proving Friendſhip while it ſtands upon a Foundation of ſound Morality. And made the moſt innocent Engagement of Life the moſt highly Entertaining and Uſeful together. If we make any Apology, it's due to the Author, for preſenting his Notions no more to Advantage; for coming no nearer the Beauties of the Original. The French *way of Writing being very different from Ours, we have follow'd him no cloſer in the Tranſlation. If the Work has ſuffer'd by the Alteration there is, it was however intended to make it more Acceptable.*

AN

AN ESSAY UPON FRIENDSHIP.

THERE's nothing ſo common as Pretences to Friendſhip; tho' Few know what it means, and Fewer yet come up to its Demands. By talking of it, we ſet our ſelves off; but when we enquire into it, we ſee our defects; and when we heartily engage in't, we muſt charge thro' abundance of difficulty.

The Veneration it has challeng'd in every Age (the moſt barbarous not excepted) is a ſtanding Teſtimony of its Excellence. And the more valuable it is, the more are we concern'd to be in-

ſtructed in it. Tho' after all, the Diſcovery goes againſt the grain; as it throws off the fond Conceit we have long entertain'd, in order to eſtabliſh Notions that are uſeful. Wou'd it not mortifie any Man that's hugg'd and careſs'd by a crowd of Admirers, to tell him he's in the Arms of thoſe that deſpiſe him? That the obliging Qualities they are ſo infinitely taken with, are nothing but his Eaſineſs and Folly? Wou'd it not grieve him to wake out of ſuch a pleaſing Dream, to be torn from his Dear Companions? Who, tho' never ſo loud in their Profeſſions of Eſteem, and readineſs to Sacrifice themſelves, will the next Minute Forſake or Betray him? And what Thanks can one expect from theſe Trencher Friends, for laying open the weak ſide they apply to? A good Table to Eat at, and an Airing in the Park, are no ſuch contemptible things. Theſe methinks I dare Diſoblige, and wou'd Merit their Reſentments, if there's hope of diſabuſing the other.

Yet I don't promiſe my ſelf much. For ſince it coſts the Rich and the Great no trouble to get Friends, but Fortune ſends 'em in ready made, there's no need

to

to go about and pick 'em up. A good Opinion of themſelves may keep 'em from miſtruſting thoſe Friendſhips they have; and they wou'd not be ſlighted in offering at new ones. Shall I find a Man that upon due Examination of thoſe he Loves, and thoſe he thinks himſelf belov'd by, has the Courage to own, 'tis his State and Fortune that he's courted for; that he values others but as they're ſerviceable, or may be ſo; and that Virtue and Merit have the beſt ſhare of the Engagement?

The Friendſhip we recommend is Union of Affections, that ſprings from a generous reſpect to Virtue, and is maintain'd by Harmony of Manners. It's a mighty miſtake to call every trifling Commerce by this ſerious Name. That empty Compliments, and Viſits of Ceremony, where no more's intended than to paſs the Time, and ſhew the Equipage, ſhou'd paſs for a real and well eſtabliſh'd Friendſhip. The Commonneſs of the thing won't wipe off the Abſurdity; there is as wide a difference as between a Bully and Man of Honour.

Not that I find fault with theſe Amuſements, whoſe Innocence and Conveni-

ency may protect 'em, when they paſs for nothing but what they are. But methinks I wou'd have 'em diſtinguiſh'd from their Betters: And the Language and Profeſſions bear a proportion to the real Impreſſions we have upon our Heart. We are fond of ſhewing our Accompliſhments, our Breeding rather than our Sincerity. Why ſhou'd we with ſuch Demonſtrations of Tenderneſs Embrace thoſe we can have no Value for, and perhaps Deſpiſe? Why ſhou'd we upon the Death of a Relation they wiſh'd out of the World, lay our ſelves forth in Speeches of Condoleance, and the Face of a hired Mourner? Why do we Congratulate the Good Fortune they meet with, a Place at Court, or a great Eſtate, with a Countenance as full of Joy as if 'twere our own, when in Truth we envy 'em, and are mortified by their Advancement? In ſhort, to what purpoſe do we make our Court to People, that in the next Company we Ridicule? If we'd have our Looks and Expreſſions go for what they ſeem, we are downright Hypocrites; if for leſs, it's Child's-play. To ſpeak the kindeſt things, and mean nothing by 'em, or make wry Faces without

without any real concern, is of all Fopperies the moſt inſufferable. Why ſhou'd all this Rout be made about empty Sounds and Poſtures? To make ſuch Profeſſions, and accept 'em, is to betray our own blind ſide, and play upon that of others; to impoſe upon them, and be bubbled our ſelves.

It were Imprudent, I confeſs, and Rudeneſs too, telling every Body what we think of 'em. As they have ſometimes a Hundred Faults for One Virtue, ſuch a Freedom at this muſt turn Converſation into Satyr and Invective. Humane Nature will not bear ſuch Treatment as this. One diſagreeable Truth upon the neck of another, will move a Man if he has any Gall. Such violent Methods wou'd ruin all, and deprive us of one of the beſt Offices of Life. It's therefore highly reaſonable to lay aſide this openneſs, and as the Rules of Prudence demand of us, to be ſilent upon what is not fit to be ſpoken. To bear that from others which in their Turn they take at our Hands. Let us leave the Buſineſs of Reproof to thoſe it belongs to. Theſe unwelcome Truths come with a Diſadvantage from thoſe we Love, much

much more ſo from thoſe that are indifferent to us. But is there no middle Way to be taken? Muſt we ſay all we think, becauſe muſt we ſay no more? We may be Complaiſant without ſacrificing our Integrity. We may keep our Averſion to our ſelves, but may chuſe whether we'll run out in the other extream of Commendation. Tho' we don't diſcover our Uneaſineſs, we need not be tranſported with Concern. In ſhort, we may forbear applauding thoſe we deſpiſe, without being inſenſible of their Failings.

So much larger is the Compaſs which Breeding and Civility takes, than what may be allow'd to Friendſhip. We ſhou'd not be ſo reſerv'd and ſullen as to deny Acceſs to our Neighbours, but we ſhou'd be open to none but our Friends. And here, tho' I've contracted the Sphere in which Friendſhip ſhou'd move, I foreſee I ſhall be blamed for not limiting it more. Thoſe that have labour'd the Point, are content to ſit down with a belief that it's practicable only between Two Perſons, and muſt break if ſtretch'd any farther. If Nature (ſay they) hath left us oppreſs'd by ſo many Imperfections,

perfections, that the Union of Two, how intimate ſoever, can hardly ſupport its ſelf; how much more will be expos'd to Ruin, when a fairer Mark to Accidents from without, and Miſconſtructions from within? A Man can hardly agree with himſelf. One moment he's pleas'd; the next he's out of humour. To Day he deſpiſes, what Yeſterday he was charm'd with. What Pains muſt he take to be Conſonant with himſelf; to fix his Inclination, or at leaſt to make it leſs variable? And how much more difficult will it be to make it ſuit with another Man's? This is as far as their Notions will bear us out. All beyond this, they tell us is Imaginary, and can't be reduc't to Practice. He that ſhoots out of diſtance muſt be ſhort or wide of the Mark. The Union of two Souls is the Maſter-piece of Nature. All beyond it is *Chimæra.* An Undertaking that muſt fall to the Ground becauſe it commands us farther than we have ſtrength to follow, thro' the oppoſition Fortune makes. The Inequalities of Intereſts, or Humours, where many are concern'd, muſt ſpoil the Deſign. Between Two, Allowances may be made. But when a Weight comes to lye upon

upon a number of Men, the ſhorteſt bears more than his ſhare, and of courſe lets it drop. Where Two Perſons are united in the moſt intimate Manner, as in a Married State, and their Intereſts in every thing made the ſame: Where Nature has contriv'd other Charms to make the Union ſit eaſie: Where Self-love and Revenge have no room to act, but one by making the Yoke uneaſie to his Partner, increaſes the Burthen to himſelf: Even here we find Common Intereſt a Principle too weak. And what then is to be expected from a greater number, who have more to do, and leſs powerful Motives to it? And when they've quitted this, have a Liberty of engaging in any other? If 'tis hard for a Man to be in Humour with himſelf; and harder yet with one Friend beſides: How miſerably will he be diſtracted to have his Satisfaction depending upon many; and his Quiet ſo much expoſed to Spleen and Vapours? It muſt be confeſs'd there's Reaſon in all this. And that thoſe Friendſhips are the moſt Laſting and Secure that move upon the feweſt Wheels. Yet is it not impoſſible but many may be Sharers in the ſame Heart, and

and that the ſame Heart may diſpence its influence to 'em all? The Mind of ſome Men is indeed too ſhallow for ſuch an Undertaking; to theſe I wou'd not recommend it: Nor perhaps are they capable of a Friendſhip with one. To illuſtrate the Matter in ſome Meaſure, we may take the Inſtance of a Parent with many Children. His Concern for the Miſfortunes of ſome of 'em, if it allays, yet can't deſtroy the Joy he finds in the Welfare of the Reſt.

Tho' the Conformity of Inclinations be the Life of Friendſhip, yet more than Two Perſons may be found that agree in the ſame. If the ſame Centre be common to 'em all, no matter how many Lines be drawn from it. If Virtue be this Centre, the Principle upon which every one acts, there will an Agreement and Proportion in the whole. Whilſt all are purſuing this Common Intereſt, all are travelling the ſame Courſe, nothing can break the Union of their Affections and Deſires. The Danger is only from irregular Motions, and forgetting the Point from which every one ſhou'd act. So long as we maintain a reſpect to this Principle of Union, and keep

Virtue

Virtue in the Throne, our Humour and Caprice will be check'd and ſubdued. If Intereſt can form and maintain Societies, as we find it does; why ſhou'd not thoſe who are acted by a higher Principle (and with ſuch only is our Buſineſs) do at leaſt as much, if not more?

It may be ſaid, from hence I Conclude all good Men are Friends, if Virtue be the Life of Friendſhip. The Conſequence is good as far as Eſteem goes. If they knew one another, they wou'd value one another. But tho' Friendſhip is founded in Eſteem ſo much that it cannot otherwiſe ſubſiſt, there goes however ſomething more to form it. Eſteem is a Tribute due to Merit in General, but Friendſhip is an Improvement made upon Merit, and engages us in a very different Degree. Such Impreſſion has been made upon the Heart as can't well be deſcribed. And works like a Mother's Affection to her own Children, above thoſe of Strangers, as amiable in themſelves.

Thoſe who wou'd have Friendſhip confin'd to the narroweſt Compaſs, have Notions of it the moſt ſublime: Tho' Number, if practicable, may be highly uſeful.

uſeful. To have Friends at all times, and in all places, ſome eminently qualified to one purpoſe, ſome to another. For to have but one Friend, may ſometimes be to have none. Or which is the ſame thing, none when we want him. The Circumſtances of Time, and Place, and Ability too, may make it proper that we have more than one Bottom to venture in. The Offices of Friendſhip are various; to direct our Choice, and rectifie our Miſtakes. To ſuſtain our Misfortunes, and moderate our Joys, and the like. This may poſſibly be better done by the Care and Endeavours of many.

Not that I wou'd have Friendſhip govern'd by Profit and Convenience. A Motive ſo mean can produce nothing Extraordinary. There's ſomething generous in the Compoſition, that looks at another Man's Advantage as much as my own. And yet all this needs not exclude Conſiderations of its Uſefulneſs. Virtue its ſelf does not deſpiſe Rewards, but propoſes a Pleaſure in Reflection.

And that we may not talk without a Precedent for what we ſay. The Sages of Old, whoſe Friendſhips were ſo well cultivated,

tivated, and became ſo famous as to be handed down to the preſent time, even theirs were divided into ſeveral Streams. The moſt Polite Nations, and their Philoſophers too, gave us Examples of that ſort to build upon.

It were difficult to determine juſt how many make a *Quorum* of Friends. Some fix the Number to Three, others allow a greater Latitude. But this Rule will ſerve us, the fewer the better. And he that thinks he has a great number of Friends, has moſt Reaſon to believe he has none at all.

We don't love to be cheated in any thing; in this eſpecially, ſhou'd we be moſt Circumſpect, as it wou'd be of all things the greateſt Loſs, and no Equivalent to be had.

To proceed. He that thinks to divide himſelf amongſt many, can afford but a ſmall Part to every one. His Affections ſpun out at length have indeed the Advantage of reaching further, but they loſe it again in their Strength and Uſefulneſs. And he ſhou'd look for no more than he gives. As Friendſhip is the exchanging of Offices, the Service ſuch a Man expects muſt be of the ſame ſtrain

ſtrain with that he does. No Man cares to ſet his whole Heart againſt a piece of yours. Tho' we allow nothing Mercenary in the Caſe, yet this is but neceſſary to ſhew we are Sincere. One Friend may bring a larger ſhare into the Stock, but that muſt only be when the other has no more to bring, not when he Employs it otherwiſe. If I take a walk for Converſation ſake, it ſhou'd rather be with a Man that can mind what he's talking of, than one that's pull'd every Minute by the Sleeve, and interrupted with Buſineſs or Howd'ye's. To ſay no more; it muſt be a faint and languiſhing Correſpondence which we think to maintain in ſo many different places. Such as this is uſually no other than common Civility and ſometimes Vanity or Idleneſs creates. Keep the Stream of your Affections as much united as poſſible. If you turn it into many Channels it may ſerve to water and refreſh the Country, but will not bear a Veſſel of Burthen.

'Twas a good return of *Socrates* when his Houſe was thought too little, wou'd to God I cou'd fill it with True Friends. After all, if one cou'd have a Barn full,

one wou'd wiſh for no more than a Cloſet will hold.

Let the Matter at laſt turn upon this, ſetting aſide the Reaſons I have offered. The difficulty we ſhall find in the Choice of our Friends, will make us rejoice we have but few to chuſe. Of ſuch Importance is the Work, 'tis ſo hard to ſucceed, and yet ſo dangerous to miſcarry. So ſevere an enquiry into the Inclination and Merits of the Perſon, and the Experience we muſt run thro' before we are ſafe in their Hands, will convince us, that to gain Three or Four in the Courſe of our Life, is to employ it well.

Whence is it ſo many Friendſhips clapt up on a ſudden, which have the Air of a veterane, not a raw and undiſciplined, Affection; and look like the meeting of old Friends, not new ones: Whence can it be theſe ſo promiſing and kindly Advances ſhou'd ſo ſoon be overturn'd? 'Tis becauſe they began too ſoon, and run up too faſt. And is there any Myſtery in this, that Time ſhou'd deſtroy what we ſet up without conſulting him? We meet, and at firſt ſight like one another well. The next thing

is

is to ſay ſo, and the next in courſe to be Dear Friends. We vow and ſwear eternal Amity; and then we go to conſidering. We underſtand him: We grow cool: And at length come to hate him. We ſwing our ſelves up by main force, and our own weight brings us down again. 'Tis indeed the orderly Courſe of Nature to proportion the Progreſs of things to the Power that raiſes 'em. And when we follow Nature inſtead of Reaſon, we ſucceed accordingly. This unhappy diſcord of Inclination, this reverſe of my own Humour which I find in my Friend, this Imperfection of his Conduct, who cou'd ever have dream't of? True, But why did I go blindfold to Work? No more perhaps wou'd another have found it out in Two or Three Hours; eſpecially if 'twas induſtriouſly conceal'd. But where's the wonder, you did not find what you ne'er beſtowed the looking for? We examine our Money before we take it, and not afterwards, for then the loſs is ours. In other things we can't find in our Heart to do our ſelves Juſtice. We wou'd fain get the blame off our ſelves, and fix it upon the Alteration of a Man's Humour, which in

Juſtice is due to our own Imprudence. They are not the ſame as when we knew 'em firſt, and ſo we mend one Overſight by another. We admir'd perhaps ſomething in 'em that they have not, and now we've thrown 'em off, we won't ſee what may be juſtly valu'd in them.

Wou'd you contract a Friendſhip that ſhall laſt a long time? Be a long time in contracting it. Let not Shadows paſs for Reality. Diſtinguiſh a ſuperficial from a laſting good: That which pleaſes ſometimes, from that which may always pleaſe. Let Inclination take a Freedom, but not to Domineer. An agreeable Object may have our Looks, and yet not command our Heart. There may ſurely be a Medium between ſhutting our Eyes, and running thro' a River after it. Let things engage you no farther than their Intrinſic Value will bear you out. We may talk with a Man in his way, and divert our ſelves with thoſe that are diſpos'd to do the ſame; and all this without making 'em our Friends. I'll be Merry with thoſe that are merrily inclin'd, and Serious with thoſe that will hold an Argument; I can paſs my Time with 'em at

at their own Diſcourſe. If I'm Hunting, what is it to me whether with Perſons skill'd in Mathematicks, or the Languages, or in nothing at all? But if I'd a Secret to impart, or a Scruple of Conſcience to be clear'd, I ſhou'd wiſh for one I knew, and might depend upon. Theſe Men may be agreeable as far as one wou'd have to do with Strangers; but yet it does not follow we ſhou'd take 'em for Confidents. A Perſon with whom one wou'd exchange the higheſt Offices of Life, ſhou'd be one of a Generous and Noble Diſpoſition; and that we can't know of a ſudden. A Man whoſe Underſtanding is defective, is not fit to make a Friend of; nor he whoſe Practice is not ſuitable to his Underſtanding. What can one do with either of 'em? To be ſtupid or perverſe amounts in Effect to the ſame. One may forgive Inſenſibility, and demand no more than Nature has given, but one can't forgive one's ſelf for venturing a Satisfaction with ſuch apparent diſadvantage. To what purpoſe is a Correſpondence with either of theſe? How can one Heart be ſecure in the keeping of him that betrays it thro' Folly, or that does it with Deſign?

One when he wou'd ſerve us, can't; t'other when he can, has other Buſineſs.

There ſhou'd how ever be a mighty difference made between Able and Willing. 'Tis hard, I confeſs, for ſome Men to comprehend the Delights of Friendſhip. If the Palate can't judge of Meats, to what purpoſe do we provide Rarities? But however, of the Two, give me ſubſtantial Integrity, tho' it wants the Ornament of a quick Apprehenſion. The ſtrength of Friendſhip lyes in virtuous Manners; and we may obſerve that Nature has often ſupplied other Defects with a reſolute Fidelity. Beſides, Friendſhip is not a *Smithfield* Bargain; and one wou'd chuſe to be Generous in the Partnerſhip. Equal Matches in all Caſes are moſt like to prove Happy. And it were to be wiſh'd none wou'd aſpire to what's above him. Yet if any think fit to condeſcend, he does not preſently undo himſelf. Tho' the Truth on't is, as Friendſhip is founded in Eſteem, one wou'd have ſomething for Fancy to feed upon.

But from a Vicious Man I ſhou'd deſire to ſtand off altogether. By a vicious Man, I mean not one liable to Failings, as all Men are; but one that acts without

out any Reſpect to Honour and Conſcience. He's out of his Element when he makes an Engagement that is ſupported only by Principles of Virtue.

Nor is this built upon my ſingle Opinion, both *Athens* and *Rome* taught the ſame. And all civiliz'd Nations, that diſcover'd the Capacity of the Soul, applied themſelves to Offices of Friendſhip, as the principal Happineſs Converſation affords. And the firſt Stone of the Building they agreed to be Virtue, without which nothing uſeful or laſting cou'd be rais'd. Merit produces Eſteem, and Eſteem ſuppoſes a Conformity of Manners, which all Ages have held to be the Ground of a well eſtabliſh'd Friendſhip. If nothing more were requiſite to the Choice of Friends, but ſuch an Eſteem as ſprings from a ſudden Approbation of ſomething that's good in 'em, the Vicious might be taken into that Order. But the Eſteem here intended including Experience of their Virtues, and not a blind Paſſion, they can never be admitted. The thing I plead for, is, and has been always, reckoned a Treaſure ſacred, and above the reach of Vicious Men. 'Tis a Bleſſing in which Vir-

tue has the ſole Propriety. And as Virtue has but few Rewards to propoſe, thoſe few are to be found no where elſe.

A Commerce (for Friendſhip it can't be call'd) that has no other eſtabliſhment than Inſtinct or Intereſt, will ever fail when there is moſt need of its Services. That which join'd for Convenience, will part for the ſame. The Union of Soul and Affections we are ſpeaking of, has ſhined in the darkeſt Ages.

Friendſhip had its Altars amongſt the *Scythian* Deities: Was pray'd to as a Goddeſs, whoſe Influence was moſt highly beneficial. Nothing was accounted more Venerable amongſt 'em; they brought up their Children with a Devotion to it. As it included all Offices of Honour and Virtue, they made it their chief Good, advancing it even above the rate of Riches, which comparatively they held in Contempt. Men this way famous in their Regeneration, had the Character of Heroes, and their Memory perpetuated for it. Nay, the Reſpect they ow'd it had ſo much the Aſcendant of their Natural Averſions, that they admir'd it where-ever it was found; in thoſe who were

were perfect Strangers, and ſometimes in their Enemies. Which appears from their Dedicating Temples to *Oreſtes* and *Pylades*, and paying Divine Honours to 'em: This, if there were no other, might ſerve for a Proof their Notions had a real Foundation; and were better ſecur'd than upon the weak Poſſeſſions of Fancy, or the deceitful Cords of Intereſt. That which is the Eſſential Conſtitution of Friendſhip, is that which diſtinguiſhes it from all other Pretences. That it Dares, and Deſires, to come to the Light. That it moves not upon Ignorance or Deſign; but upon a thorough Acquaintance and Underſtanding of its Subject: And ſteers by Honour, not by Intereſt.

On the contrary; 'tis in vain that we make large Preſents to a Man who has neither Want, nor Merit; it can paſs for nothing but Prodigality. Nor will the obſequious Diligence with which we pay our Court to thoſe we Hope to be the better for, go for any more than Self-love and Policy. The Tenderneſs we ſhew for our rich Friends when they're Dying is in Truth directed to our ſelves. A certain Author compares this kind

At-

Attendance to a Crow watching a weak Sheep, to pick her Eyes out.

All this may be done out of Gratitude, and in Conſideration of Favours receiv'd. And when it will bear this Senſe, it's Pity we ſhou'd look for a worſe. Patterns of Virtue are not ſo generally expoſed to View, that we ſhou'd rob them of their Luſtre. In ſhort, he that wou'd be accounted Liberal, muſt act upon a better Principle than Proſpect of Advantage. And he that wou'd be taken for a true Friend, muſt act out of a generous Diſpoſition: From Principles ſo firm and ſteady, as Men of Deſign are Strangers to. Where Intereſt is the Principle of Union, the Union can no longer ſubſiſt than Intereſt is on your ſide. Such a Man will Defend you one Day, and Ruin you the next himſelf. Whilſt your Cauſe is his own, you need not fear his pleading it; but when the Caſe alters, you ſee no more of him.

All this makes good what I've been ſaying, That Engagements with People, either Impertinent or Deſigning, are not worth the Having. And that we muſt diſtinguiſh between the Offices of Friendſhip, and the Buſineſs, Convenience and Diver-

Diverſions, of Life. That inſtead of preſcribing tedious Methods for the Choice of Friends, I need only repeat this eſtabliſh'd Truth: That we can't know Men too well before we make 'em our Friends; and only the Virtuous are capable of Friendſhip. Virtue implies a Conformity of Manners; and ſo the Frame being fix'd upon a True bottom, and encreaſing by regular Advances, becomes at length compleat.

There's one thing more I ſhou'd touch upon, which ſome will have to be of mighty Conſequence, tho' others eſteem it but a Nicety, and that is a Conformity of Humour. Friendſhip, 'tis certain, may ſubſiſt either between thoſe of the ſame, or thoſe of different Humours: Tho' on one ſide it may be ſaid there's a ſweetneſs in Uniſons; on t'other different Parts, and juſt Proportions, afford more grateful Entertainment. If for the purpoſe there be ſuch an Agreement of Complexion, as Two Friends are in the Spleen, who ſhall divert it? If they're both Quick-ſilver, who ſhall correct it? 'Tis eaſie to apprehend a Difference here may contribute to the Happineſs of both. Strength and Beauty do beſt together.

Brisk

Brisk and Airy, with Sedate and Solid, make an excellent Compoſition. From ſuch an Union as this may be expected conſiderable Service. But to ſpeak the Truth, running the Matter too far, and bringing Friendſhip under theſe ſevere Philoſophick Rules, which propoſe all Profit, and exclude all Pleaſure, is make it Impracticable. Delight may be allow'd its Share as well as Improvement, 'Twill be a ſort of Drudgery to People ſo unequally yoak'd. And methinks Agreement of Humour ſpares abundance of uneaſineſs on all ſides. Let the Spleenitick lye ſtill, and the Sprightly Temper keep going, Time will be a Cure for both. And perhaps more effectual, as well as more acceptable, than the wiſeſt of their Friends that attempt it.

Yet the moſt renown'd of our Modern Poets, who have preſented us with the moſt compleat Models of Friendſhip, choſe to give it a Luſtre from the diſagreement of Humours. And this they have done in what they reckon their Maſter-piece.

Corneille in his *Rhodogune*, introduces *Seleucus* and *Antiochus* for his Chief Characters. *Seleucus* is Haughty, Violent and

and Jealous; *Antiochus* Condeſcending, Flexible and Serene. Theſe Two Brothers had no ſmall Argument of Contention, they diſputed nothing leſs than a Miſtreſs and a Crown. His commanding Genius allows 'em of Humours far different, and yet brings 'em off Friends inſeparably united.

Moliere in his *Miſantrope* puſhes the thing ſtill farther. *Aleeſtes* and *Philinta*, his brighteſt Parts expreſſes the Excellence and Harmony of Friendſhip in Tempers vaſtly diſtant. *Aleeſtes* Auſtere and Melancholick, ſets forth Virtue Frowning and Severe, enough to look Vice out of Countenance, and make it Tremble. *Philinta* Gay and Pleaſant, by an Appearance ſo Kind and Taking, invites to a Familiarity with Virtue. Virtue the common Principle, makes theſe Two but One, by Bonds ſo Powerful as Diverſity of Humour can't diſſolve. Uniſon here had ruin'd the fineſt Part, Concord in Variety.

This was proper, I confeſs, upon the Stage, where exact Conformity of Humour wou'd have made the Entertainment flat. But as great a Liberty as Poets have, 'tis ſtill confin'd to the Rules of Nature.

Their

Their *Pegaſus*, tho' he has Wings, does not truſt to 'em altogether, but keeps the Road of Humane Probability. The Genius of theſe Celebrated Men is an Authority the thing is practicable. But in this, by the way, Friends muſt be the ſame, however otherwiſe diſagreeing, to be of an Humour perfectly Sweet and Complaiſant.

Equality of Birth and Fortune is by ſome made a Point neceſſary to a well inſtructed Friendſhip. And it muſt be ſaid the Rule were to be embrac'd, if we cou'd, when we pleaſe, find as good Men of our own Rank as otherwhere. But conſidering there are but few of any Rank fit to be choſen, we ſhou'd look at the ſolid Foundation of Merit, and paſs by meer Accompliſhments. We make no League with the Coat of Arms, and the Liveries, but with the Man. And with that Part of the Man too that is conſider'd abſtractedly from both. Theſe things are not fix'd to the Freehold.

Not but that one ſhou'd carry it with diſtance and regard which is due to Perſons of Condition. If they condeſcend to lay aſide their State, there's no Reaſon we ſhou'd take Advantage of the

Level.

Level. The acknowledgment of a Civility is ſurely leſs than the doing it. Diſtinction may be laid aſide, but it's not the Inferiour's part to demand it ſhou'd. Both ſides will agree upon their Duty in this Point, if they're over-rul'd by the more Material Conſideration of Merit and True Virtue. Yet the Language of the Age, at leaſt the Thoughts, go to another Tune. The Mother Charges her Son to keep up the Honour of his Family and Education: Above all things to be ſeen in no Company below himſelf: To have a juſt value for Quality and Extraction, and the like. And ſhe's much in the right, if her Caution goes no farther than to exclude the Sordid and Ill-bred. But if ſhe means, as ſometimes it happens, thoſe of as much Deſert as himſelf, tho' under ſome diſadvantage of Birth or Condition, ſhe may chance, with all her Pruning, to cut off the beſt Branches of his Acquaintance. 'Tis her failing to overlook an Abſurdity in Morals, if it has been taken up amongſt Men of Title. As if quoting great Names in his Diſcourſe cou'd atone for Vices of the ſame Extraction. In this I differ from the Unthinking Part of the World,

World, but my Buſineſs is not with them. 'Tis with thoſe that acknowledge an Obedience due to Reaſon, and do their beſt to inform themſelves in it's Dictates. Who know how to diſtinguiſh Virtue from a Counterfeit, and pay a Reſpect where-ever it's due. Theſe will agree with me, to ſet no higher Value upon the Accidents of Fortune, than as they may be truly ſerviceable. Yet theſe things are ſometimes good and uſeful Indications; a good Introduction to what we look for. Honour, and Greatneſs of Spirit, are often owing to a Generous Education, good Inſtructions and Example. One wou'd preſume farther upon the Behaviour of a Man genteelly Bred, than another that wanted the Advantage. But on the other hand, there are Inſtances to be met with of ſuch as have outſtretch'd Expectation, as well as thoſe that have fallen ſhort of it. Theſe ſhou'd be look'd upon with as much Favour, and rather more, for having hammer'd out themſelves into the Perfections they have. We may pay every Man his Reſpect and Diſtance that is due to him: but when we look for a Friend, one that is to be received into the moſt intimate

Union,

Union, we ſhou'd take *Diogenes* Lanthorn, and conſider him abſtractedly from the outſide and appearance.

In Marriages and Covenants that work upward and downward, both theſe Conſiderations are not to be impos'd. As our Anceſtors may be injur'd in their Honour, and a diſadvantage may reach to our Heirs, there is not allowed the ſame diſintereſted Freedom, as in contracting a Friendſhip. To Conclude, An inequality of Rank and Fortune carries this particular Advantage along with it, that it keeps a Friendſhip ſecure from the Hazards of contending Intereſts. Intereſt, it's True, is ſuppoſed to ſtrike Sail amongſt thoſe who love one another. Yet we have but too many Examples where it has diſputed the Sovereignty. And the beſt reſolv'd (ſo little can we depend upon our ſelves) are ſafeſt at a diſtance from Temptation. A good Employment, or a Miſtreſs, may ſet Equals at Variance, when either thinks his Friend may reſign as well as he.

Set this againſt the Convenience a Level affords of knowing our Friends more exactly before we ſtrike the League. Againſt the Difficulties of Condeſcenſion

here, and due Diſtance there: Things ſo little Eſſential to the Nature of Friendſhip, that in Publick a Maſter of the Ceremonies will be wanting to adjuſt 'em. All this I ſay conſider'd, 'twill be hard to determine on either ſide the Queſtion.

AN

AN ESSAY UPON FRIENDSHIP.

PART. II.

HAVING treated in the Firſt Part of the Nature of Friendſhip, the Precaution neceſſary to the Choice of Friends, and the Qualities that recommend 'em to one another: We proceed to the Behaviour ſuch an Alliance demands.

As the firſt Inſtitution of Government in Families, and States, was for the good of Mankind, and had a regard to the

Happineſs and Security of every particular Subject, confining the Licentious, and protecting the Innocent: So the Societies into which we have a Liberty left us of forming our ſelves, and to which we find our ſelves Naturally diſpos'd, conduce to the Happineſs of every Member. The Engagements of Friendſhip, the Exchange of Offices, are the Benefit and the Improvement of the Tranquility private Men enjoy under the auſpicious Ordinance of Heaven. Hence we may reap both Profit and Delight, and what can we propoſe better than pleaſant and uſeful together?

Amongſt the Obligations of Friendſhip there's none more undeniably ſo than the making a common Bank of our Joys and our Sorrows. Nor any thing at laſt that is more for the Advantage of every Sharer. Our Griefs are more eaſily born by a Number than by one particular Perſon. And our Enjoyments are of ſuch a Nature that we make others partake 'em, without diminiſhing our own private Satisfaction, but on the contrary increaſing it. To this end we muſt maintain a Correſpondence ſo intimate, that none of our own Affairs ſhall be

be a Secret to our Friends; but by a free and open Confidence our Soul ſhall be diſcharged into his. But ſtill with a reſerve to the Secrets of a Third Perſon which may have been committed to our keeping.

The agreeableneſs of ſuch a Confidence and openneſs of Heart is perhaps the greateſt that the World affords. For ſo the weight of an Affliction falls the lighter for being diſpers'd. And Joy is more generally diffuſive and beneficial.

There's more of Politicks than Generoſity in the receiv'd Maxim; that we ſhou'd Love with ſuch indifference as if we were hereafter to Hate; and Hate as if we were hereafter to Love. This is to confound things, as if Good and Evil cou'd be confin'd to the ſame Rules. Becauſe we muſt be cool in things Indifferent and Unneceſſary, does it follow from thence we muſt be ſo in our Buſineſs? In Vice it's a good Method (and Hatred is no better) to indulge it as little as we can. But when we are preſcribing, it may as well be thrown aſide altogether. Paſſion is a thing that ends in Shame and Repentance; and the ſooner we come to it the better. But

it is not ſo with virtuous Actions. None ever thought upon a review he had follow'd Virtue too cloſe, and that he had Reaſon to reproach himſelf for Zeal in a good Cauſe. The ſhorteſt Follies are the beſt; and by the ſame Reaſon the leaſt violent too: But we're out of the way when we apply this Moderation to things Honourable and Good in themſelves.

If by Hating we underſtand that Earneſtneſs with which we fall upon our Enemies: And that we ſhou'd not provoke them too much, with whom we may hereafter be reconcil'd: Even here too the Rule fails. For in a generous Hoſtility; and of ſuch only we ſpeak, a Man ſhou'd act with Zeal: And not betray his Cauſe and his Principles in hopes of better Terms for himſelf. So that the Poſition is needleſs if we take it this way, and falſe the other. If we ſteer by it in the Buſineſs of Friendſhip, we loſe our Deſign, and ruin the Advantage we propoſe by the Commerce, for fear of running the common Hazards. As it was founded in Reaſon and Virtue, why ſhou'd we diſtruſt its Succeſs? Of what uſe is it if it may never

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be truſted out of Leading-ſtrings? One wou'd rather expect, what ſet out with ſuch Information, and took ſuch Precaution before a Reſolve, ſhou'd be fit to venture into the World. It were indeed Prudence to be upon our Guard, and ſuſpect Treachery, where no more went to forming an Alliance, than Fancy, or a common Intereſt. In ſuch Caſes we can't be too much upon the Reſerve, expecting a Fabrick ſo ſlightly run up, ſhou'd be as ſuddenly over-turn'd. But when once we are fix'd upon a good bottom, and by Steps of Wiſdom have made our Choice, we may be allow'd to enjoy it. And not ſpend our Days in a timerous Diſtruſt, which is no more than preparation for Enjoyment.

To what purpoſe is ſuch a Confidence? How ſhall we conſult one another in Diſtreſs? And look for a Remedy to the Difficulties we ſuffer or expect? If we take our Friend for one that will betray us at ſometime, we may as well believe he'll do it now. If we look upon him as one that will rejoice at our Diſgrace, and make Advantage of our weak ſide. In one word, how ſhall we lay our Heart open with any Satisfacti-

on, to a Man we foreſee will make us repent he ever knew it.

And if the Engagement be reduc'd to this, how is it better than none at all? Why do we talk of Friendſhip if our Confidences go no farther than with Strangers? 'Tis as if I ſay, Invite this Man to your Houſe, he'll be of Uſe to you a Hundred ways. Let your Doors be ever open to him; admit him to your Table; and take him abroad with you. But remember, he's like enough to cut your Throat, when you little think on't. You'll reckon it better Counſel to keep your Door faſt againſt ſuch a Man: To be upon your Guard, and treat with your Weapon in your Hand. This is juſt the Caſe, and juſt the Enjoyment, that's to be had amongſt our Friends, whom we look upon as thoſe who muſt ſhortly be our Enemies. As much as this Maxim has obtain'd, and as great a Name as it has to recommend it, no leſs than one of the *Grecian* Sages; it gives us not a more ſublime, but meaner Idea of Friendſhip.

To enter a little into their Reaſons. We find (ſay they) by every Day's ſorrowful Experience, that our Friends are miſerably

ſerably Falſe and Inconſtant. That Paſſion turns to Indifference, and oppoſite Intereſts embroil the Correſpondence with Jealouſie and Deſign.

To run the riſque of a Diſappointment which might have been prevented, lays us open to Shame and Remorſe. Whereas a timely Proviſion againſt what may happen, and foreſeeing the Storm, we may get into Port before it falls.

It's granted we are but too often deceiv'd in our Friends, and their Mind may change; it's far from invariable. Miſtake and Inconſtancy are the Lot of Humane Nature. But the Caution is miſ-timed here. We ſhou'd be exactly Circumſpect upon what bottom we Embark; but when that's done, go on boldly our Courſe. I wou'd not adviſe any Man to reſign his Heart to Fancy, and deliver himſelf up to a Whimſical Inclination: To engage over Head and Ears where he ſhall wiſh himſelf the next Minute Free: No more than to put to Sea in a Cock-boat, where he ſhall ſoon repent his Undertaking. But when he has all the Security to go upon that can be had againſt the Wind and Waves; and that others for Neceſſity or Conve-

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nience venture with; why ſhou'd he tor-
ment himſelf with Apprehenſion of the
worſt that can happen? Why ſhou'd he
not rather chearfully continue his Voyage
'Tis time enough to ſuffer things when they
arrive. Provided we ſet out with due
Care at firſt, why ſhou'd we be Ship-
wrack'd with Imagination? Juſt as rea-
ſonable it wou'd be to demand a De-
monſtration the Ship cannot ſink, as an
Alliance that cannot be broken. And
yet we muſt venture it, or have none but
mercenary Friendſhips. The Remorſe
that follows upon Diſappointments has
nothing to do with thoſe that act upon
Reaſon. If the Miſcarriage be from any
Negligence of mine, I am really con-
cern'd, if from the Neceſſity of Things
it no ways reflects upon me. Our Judg-
ment is not infallible. Conſidering what
we are, 'tis no ſuch wonder to be
miſtaken ſometimes. Shou'd one to the
fear of this Sacrifice all the ſweetneſs of
a ſincere and tender Friendſhip? 'Tis
vanity to think we can take ſuch wiſe
and cautious Methods as to inſure the
Event. On the other hand, 'tis Stupi-
dity to loſe all the Advantages Conver-
ſation

ſation may import, for the Hazards that are inſeparable from it.

Let it never be taken for a Paradox, that a Man may get Credit by being deceiv'd. It may ſo happen as to be a juſt Tribute to Mankind. 'Tis a proof of our own generous and undeſigning Temper, not to be Jealous before we've had Reaſon. Cheat me once, ſay the *Scots*, and you're to blame; again, and I'll forgive you. To act with a diſtruſt to all Humane Kind is to give an unlucky repreſentation of our own Heart. If we Meaſure by our own Buſhel, it ſhews they have Reaſon to beware of us. Such a Man wou'd do well to have a Care he does not betray himſelf. 'Twas bravely ſaid of *Cæſar*, I had rather Die once in Earneſt, than Die perpetually with Apprehenſion.

To begin with the Obligations of Friendſhip, we ſhou'd Intereſt our ſelves in whatever concerns one another. Not only in the greateſt Exigencies of Life, but as well in Matters of leſs Importance. We lay the Colours too deep, and impoſe too great Auſterities, if nothing be admitted but what's Neceſſary and Serious. We may, and we ſhou'd, contribute

bute to the innocent Pleaſures of ou Friends. And enter into the leaſt unea- ſineſs, tho' we h'an't opportunity of ſhew- ing our ſelves very Generous, and getting much Honour by it. In Matters o Conſequence we muſt ſhew the whole ſtrength of our Affections; in leſſer w may expreſs their Reality. It may neve happen that we can ſerve 'em in any thing conſiderable: But an obliging Ten- derneſs upon every Occaſion diſcovers our Willingneſs to do it.

'Tis agreeable enough to have a Friend with whom we may Converſe, and im- part our moſt ſecret Thoughts with Free- dom. To diſcover our Opinion without being reckoned indiſcreet, or having it miſinterpreted; with a Familiarity that lets our Words paſs without Examinati- on. A Complaiſance that overlooks the bluntneſs of Diſcourſe, and paſſes by our little Humours. In a word, that holds nothing unpardonable but inſincerity.

To wiſh for a Friend without failings, is to wiſh for no Friend at all. Is there any one of Humane Race ſo perfect as to be without a Fault? And if not, where's the Juſtice of expecting more from others than we perform our ſelves? It were to

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be wiſhed that Friends, like Lovers, were blindfold when one another's Defects appear; this wou'd make 'em Happy indeed. But ſince 'tis hard ſo far to command themſelves as not to ſee what muſt mortifie; if they generouſly paſs it over afterwards, 'tis all a Caſe. If they can command their Reſentment and Diſguſt, 'tis as much as to command their Eyes. There's nothing more common than to have one's Words or Actions miſinterpreted. And if for want of Skill or Care a Man lets any thing drop that won't bear examining, there's ſomebody always ready with his Reflections; and in the next Company to make a Jeſt of him that ſaid it. Now this a Friend will Abhor and Diſcourage in others. He will not ſuffer the Blind-ſide to make an Impreſſion of Contempt, ſuch as it does in Strangers. In one word, the failings of thoſe we Love we ſhou'd not look at in a Perſpective, unleſs we turn the wrong end to make 'em leſs than they are. We ſhou'd paſs 'em by, as we do a Man in the Street whom we will not ſee. There are Means, if we pleaſe to uſe 'em, ſtrong enough to correct our Spleen, ſuppoſing the Symptoms to be of

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the worſt Sort. When our Complaiſance grows tired, 'tis but taking a view of our own Imperfections, preſenting the worſt of our ſelves, and 'twill do the Work. 'Tis a Thouſand to One but our own Scale is the heavieſt, if we hold 'em fairly. But admitting the contrary, that we find ſo much greater reaſon for an exalted Opinion of our ſelves, we may remember the partiality which naturally overcomes us, and claps a Biaſs upon our Judgment. Let us reflect upon what Strangers ſay of us, or for once ſubmit to a Jury of Enemies. If we bring our ſelves off here, there's no farther Argument for Humility. Unleſs we have recourſe to the receiv'd Maxim, That we know not the worſt of our ſelves. If this will not do, there's too much reaſon to conclude our Caſe deſperate; as it's the moſt dangerous Symptom for the Sick to feel no diſorder. For once pluck up the Courage to ask this Queſtion, What am I that can bear with nothing in a Friend? How came I by the Title of Infallibility? What Right have I to expect a Man ſhou'd lay out upon me his whole Stock of Complaiſance, and be content with a return of ill Humour and Impatience? The

The Fruit of Reflections, ſo natural and ſo juſt, wou'd certainly be this, That thoſe very failings which ſeem'd to weaken the Bonds of Friendſhip, ſerve to make 'em ſtronger. You'll be aſhamed of the Difficulty you made in overlooking the falſe Steps of another, when you remember his Generous Behaviour to you, his Tenderneſs that cou'd paſs by greater. Far from repenting the Complaiſance you have ſhewn, you'll repent that it went no farther. And whatever Inſtances of Affection you have given, will acknowledge there are more behind. Much more might be ſaid of theſe leſſer Obligations of Friendſhip, which ſerve to make it more agreeable and delightful. But as the other is the more important Part, and the Duty more extenſive, I paſs directly to it.

None will, I think, deny that a Man is bound to promote the Intereſt of his Friend as far as honourably he may. And whether an Occaſion offers to advance his Fortunes, or his Credit, in the World, or indeed to be of uſe to him in any reſpect, it ſhou'd be embrac'd with all Joy and Satisfaction. And it ſhou'd be managed with Dexterity too.

It is not enough to ſet out well, but we muſt proceed upon Rules of Prudence. If we do ſo, our Friends may be the better for us. He that goes by himſelf, however well-inſtructed in his way, and capable of judging when he's right, may yet depend too much upon't. Self-love is an *Ignis Fatuus*; and he that is not aware of it will run himſelf aground. Sometimes we are poſſeſs'd with a ſecret Vanity, that hurries us on after things ridiculous, when we imagine our ſelves in purſuit of what's truly great. At other times we miſtake our Intereſt, and follow it thro' ways that bring us farther off our Journey's end. Nay, ſometimes we are ridden by Imagination, and run upon a Precipice, which a little cool thinking wou'd avoid. Here's the uſe of a Friend that's knowing and ſincere, to clear up our Miſtakes, and deliver us from the falſe Guides we had taken. But his good Offices ſhou'd neither be ask'd, nor waited for. Strangers may indeed be taxed with an impertinent Curioſity, who ſpeak before they are ſpoken to: But Friends ſhou'd uſe a generous Freedom. Their Inclination tells 'em when to ſpeak, and prompts 'em what to ſay.

A Friend, as he ſeeks rather to be ſerviceable than to pleaſe, ſpeaks ſometimes what one don't care to hear. He applies not Balſam where Cauſticks are neceſſary, but ſuits his Medicines to the Cure he propoſes, and not to the Complaints of Recurring Nature. If he's to comfort the Afflicted, he's Tender and Compaſſionate: If to reſtrain the Extravagant, Firm and Severe. When you're encompaſs'd by ſuch as apply to your Weak Part, and flatter your Defects, he's ſo honeſt and ſo bold to condemn you. As he's free from the Paſſion that blinds you, he brings you off from what you've a mind to, and wou'd purchaſe by Shame and Repentance. But, by the way, don't entertain ſuch a Notion, as if nothing but ſowre were to make up the Character. Though he Reprove you Frankly, and Adviſe you Seriouſly, he may however Praiſe you with Sincerity and Satisfaction too.

Encouragement and juſt Applauſe is no leſs a Duty than Reproof. This ſort of Treatment is of uſe more ways than one. You may conclude, he that Praiſes you with a Good Will, blames you with Regret. This gives Weight and Credit

to Cenſures. He that finds nothing in us but Faults, may ſeem unjuſt, at leaſt angry and prejudiced. He that's willing to own what's commendable in us, tho he condemns what he finds amiſs, perſuades us he's in earneſt in what he ſays.

From hence it is, that none are ſo fi for the buſineſs of Reproof, as thoſe who have made it their buſineſs to find ou what is truly Praiſe-worthy. From thi Step 'tis eaſie to paſs on where we wou go. Commendation wiſely placed, re ſtrains that Natural Pride which oppoſe it ſelf, attracts that Confidence whic was withdrawing, and makes room fo ſuch Counſel to inſinuate it ſelf, a might otherwiſe have been rejected. Th pleaſure we conceive in the Praiſe that given us, makes us willing to take pai for that which is kept back. A ſight our Merits, together with our Faults, a Sort of Introduction to a frank Co feſſion of the Worſt; and ſo gives t faireſt Opportunity of Correcting 'e We're unwilling to go backwards in t good Opinion of thoſe that ſpeak w of us, and therefore undertake a R form in proſpect of deſerving what Men naturally love.

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Tell a Man bluntly of his Failings, or aggravate 'em without this prudent Antipoiſon, and you encounter at once the Vanity that flatters, the Lazineſs that ſtops him, and the Deſpair of pleaſing you, which overcomes him. Wou'd you dextrouſly diſ-ingage him from all theſe? Let a little honeſt Applauſe be the Vehicle. You diſarm his Vanity, inſpire him with Courage, and excite him to a diligent Application.

He that's under the Illuſions of Paſſion or Miſtake, is a ſick Man, and muſt be dealt with as ſuch. The Pill muſt be gilded if you'd have it go down. The difficulty is to engage him in a Work of Self-denial; when he has enter'd upon it, 'tis half done. The Glory of the Enterprize, the Shame of flying off, and ſuch Conſiderations, puſh him on. They make way for freſh Counſel, and he becomes a New Man, having found by Experience the Wiſdom of it.

Nor is this the only benefit of a Moneſt Commendation, that 'tis an Introduction to Reproof; it is as well a Support and Encouragement to Vertue. If Vertue be ſo amiable as it's repreſented, and a Reward to it ſelf, a great part of

its Reward is the Honour we merit by it.

A good Name without, anſwers to a good Conſcience within; and we can't blame a Man for deſiring to recommend himſelf to the Opinion of the Wiſe. This has ever been courted by the beſt Men. And whatever any of 'em pre tend of Abſolute Happineſs from th Thoughts of vertuous Actions, the were willing to have the Shadow g along with the Subſtance, and make i more generally taken notice of. Th Philoſophers in their Sage Diſcourſe have ever, as *Tully* obſerves, ſet thei Names to the Books they wrote again the deſire of Glory. The Law-make of all Ages have had a reſpect t this Natural Ambition, inviting Men t Obedience for the Credit they annex to it. This ſome of 'em call by th Name of Weakneſs, and yet apply to for the benefit it produces. We may ta it for the moſt juſtifiable Inſtance Self-love, and in truth allow it to be Manly Motive. The Will of Men mov upon Intereſt, and our Happineſs is, th our Intereſt is inſeparable from our Dut And when we blame a Man for purſui

his Intereſt, 'tis for leaning to ſomething lower, and leſs valuable, whilſt he quits that which is moſt truly ſo. That at laſt it's no Crime to follow our Intereſt, provided we don't miſtake it. And there's no room for the Complaint, that Vertue is too ſublime for us; for our Intereſt and our Duty agree. This ſeems a Paradox, that it's good for its own ſake, and yet are Humane Laws neceſſary to enforce it. If the World were full of Wiſe Men, this wou'd be a needleſs Care. But as many prefer a leſs to a greater, a preſent to a future, and more durable, Advantage; it is not without reaſon the Poet was aware; if you take away Rewards, Vertue muſt ſink. As therefore we may allure a Man to his Duty by this laudable Sort of Self-love, or conſideration of Intereſt; we have nothing more innocent to propoſe, or more acceptable, than the Glory he obtains. This of the Three Common Attractives is the moſt generally powerful. That of Pleaſure is almoſt ſwallow'd up in it. And the other of a plentiful Fortune, is, when gotten, frequently made uſe of but as a ſtep to Fame. Beſides that, this of the Three is a Quarry for our moſt gene-

rous Appetite; the other Two, Objects of meaner Paſſions.

It was therefore the Sages of old proportioning to every Action its juſt Reward, which has crown'd with Glory the moſt hazardous, and the moſt laborious, Undertakings. To Arms and Letters they have aſcribed a Fame far exalted above what they allow'd to any other Performances, as the greateſt Reward to ſuch as deſpiſed Life, and neglected its Amuſements. Hence it was, that in thoſe Ages, when Fame and Honour were moſt eſteem'd, the Men of thoſe Ages deſerv'd moſt eſteem. Let not this Age arrogate to it ſelf a Title to greater Modeſty; which is leſs Deſerving, and yet more Vain. We are as eagerly ſet upon Glory, though we take pains to conceal our Inclination. Our Anceſtors diſcover'd their value of it more publickly, but then they took better Care to merit it. I'll blame no Man for a Thirſt after Fame, provided he ſeek it from the Wiſe. Provided he ben't drunk with an Opinion of himſelf, and put on a haughty, inhumane, Behaviour. I'd rather have his Acquaintance, than another Man's that with an affected Humility refuſes a

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due Honour, but to take occaſion of bragging on't: Or becauſe he wou'd not give any to thoſe who deſerve it better. He that courts Praiſe more than Vertue, goes too faſt: He that ſlights the Praiſe due to his Vertues, as much too ſlow. One calls for his Wages before he has done his Work: T'other by refuſing his due, hopes to have them doubled. If there be any ſo truly Modeſt, as to refuſe it upon another ſcore, I ask his Pardon, and wiſh him more Company. But this ſeems a Point beyond which the Vertue of Modeſty need not be ſtrain'd. Let a Man be more intent upon the practice of Vertue, than upon its Reward: Let him not be Over-fond of Fame; nor let him reject it with Noiſe and Affectation. But if he dares not truſt his Natural Ambition as far as he may, for fear of going farther, let it die without the Pomp of a Funeral. Let him give this Teſt of his Humility, that he allows others their deſerv'd Praiſe, and hears them commended with as much Satisfaction as another Man.

Upon the whole, Since we have given this Liberty to our Natural Ambition, we are concern'd to beware of exceeding

it. And to fortifie our ſelves againſt the ill Effects that ſometimes follow: Such as aſſuming too much, and looking down upon others with Contempt. If we guard againſt theſe, we are ſafe. A little Praiſe, like Warlike Muſick, quickens the Slow, and revives the Languid, Spirits. It will make a Coward perform Wonders, and out-do, rather than deceive, Expectation.

Thus is it a Duty of Friendſhip, as well to Commend with Satisfaction, as to find Fault with Freedom. But as on this hand we muſt take care our Reproof be not too ſowre to go down: On the other we muſt not be ſo profuſe in our ſmooth Applauſes, as to let 'em ſwallow up the uſefulneſs of our Counſels. Praiſe ſerves to nouriſh Vertue, Flattery deſtroys it. So near are they a-kin, that we can't be too cautious of confounding 'em.

In theſe Three things 'tis the difference. Flattery makes Vertues of your Failings. It aſcribes to you thoſe good Qualities you have not. It magnifies thoſe you have. Hence it is that you know not your ſelves, becauſe you have been repreſented by falſe Gloſſes. You grow worſe inſtead of better. Will any Man labour after what he thinks he has already?

already? Will he endeavour to go higher, who thinks himſelf at the Top?

From this Root grows an Antipathy to Truth. And whoever goes that way to work is ſure to loſe his Pains. He that has made a Judgment of himſelf by the Character of thoſe that flatter'd him, muſt take every one for an Enemy that finds fault. They muſt (thinks he) be blind or ill-natur'd that can queſtion my Worth.

Thus for the empty Applauſes of deſigning Men, you deliver your ſelves up to real Diſgrace. They cry up your Vertues, whilſt in their Heart they laugh at your Weakneſs. And whilſt you admire 'em, the World deſpiſes you. So natural is the Miſtake, that a few Grains of Commendation will outweigh abundance of Blame, when a Man holds the ſcales for himſelf. And ſo dreadful an Effect has this Poiſon of Flattery, ſo ſtrongly does it fortifie it ſelf, as to defie the Force of any Remedy. A Breaſt ſo throughly poſſeſs'd by Indulgence of Self-love, leaves no Avenues unguarded, by which Sincerity may enter.

The uſe therefore of a true Friend is to prevent theſe Prepoſſeſſions. And if he

he comes too late for that, to do his beſ
toward removing 'em, though by ſtri
ving againſt a very powerful Stream. O
ſuch a one a Sycophant will ſtand in awe
when he ſees him ready to detect th
Cheat. By this is Flattery to be diſtin
guiſh'd from a modeſt and uſeful Com
mendation, that the firſt ſeeks the Ad
vantage of the Giver, the latter only o
the Receiver. And this ſhou'd make th
Advice of a ſincere Friend moſt accepta
ble, though coming with an Allay of Se
verity and Cenſure.

'Tis certainly a difficult Task for Hu
mane Nature to accept theſe Friendl
Offices with Moderation. Not to la
things to Heart we don't care to hea
of. Not to be too much pleaſed whe
we hear our ſelves commended. W
ſhou'd look upon Reproof as a Tribut
Friendſhip has to pay; upon Praiſe as
Gratuity it might have refus'd us.

We may think with our ſelves, ou
Friends find a Satisfaction in having ſome
thing to commend us for, and therefor
that Office is a Reward to it ſelf. Bu
we can never make ſufficient amends fo
the pain they ſuffer in reflecting upon th
Occaſion they have to blame us. Th

leaſt we can do, is to conceal the ſecret diſpleaſure of our Mind againſt the Perſon. To be leſs concern'd at the bitterneſs of the Remedy, than for giving any colour of diſguſt to him that offers it. And whether we are innocent or guilty, we ſhou'd ſubmit to the kindneſs of the Intention. In ſhort, with ſuch a Grace ſhou'd all Men receive the charge of a Friend, as may encourage him to renew it the next Opportunity.

It lyes too upon him that adviſes to find out Time and Place that's proper. His Sincerity will appear in his Diſcretion. We may commend before any body; but Prudence enjoins Secrecy for Reproof. A publick Reprehenſion will raiſe any Man's Blood, and ruin the Deſign. We ſhou'd not lay a Friend open to the Malice of others, and give his Enemies cauſe to rejoice.

On the contrary, 'tis a Duty of Friendſhip to make all reaſonable defence in our Friend's Caſe, and that before any Company. If he be preſent, I'm to ſecond him as well as I can: If abſent, put my ſelf in his Place, and make the beſt of his Cauſe. 'Tis a ſcandalous Liberty ſome Men take. If they have made

made an empty Profeſſion of their Ser vices to any Body, they have a Right for ſooth to expoſe all his Failings. A Man tha ſets up for this Sort of Impartiality, ma juſt as well hold his Tongue altogether The Rules of Friendſhip demand at ou Hands a publick Juſtification if he be in nocent; if in the wrong, the beſt Excuſ we can make. But never a publick Con demnation, if it can be decently avoid ed. And whenever the extremity of th Caſe makes it requiſite, let it be don with all the neceſſary Precautions.

When I ſay one ſhou'd not condemn a Friend before Strangers if it be poſſibl to avoid it, I mean if it be poſſible with out manifeſt breach of Juſtice and Ho nour, the Rule a Wiſe Man is govern'd by. In ſuch an Emergency I wou'd pro poſe theſe Cautions. In the firſt place not to condemn him in his Abſence, tha is, to condemn him unheard. And this is a point but of Common Juſtice, tho it muſt be confeſs'd too ſeldom obſerv'd If theſe things are true, (ſay the Vul gar) my Friend is not to be excus'd, and I muſt condemn him. But yet I reſerve a Power of reverſing this Judgment i the Matter ſhou'd prove otherwiſe. With

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ſubmiſſion, this is not agreeable to the ſtrict Rules of Friendſhip. This may perhaps be taken for high-flying, to advance Notions ſo ſublime. But I muſt ſay, a Man ought to defend his Friends as zealouſly and ſtrenuouſly as this amounts to. Why ſhou'd I paſs Sentence upon hearing only one ſide? It's true, the Accuſation demands it if it be juſt, but why may not I hear what my Friend has to ſay for himſelf? There are two handles (we ſay) to every thing, and I'll rather diſtruſt the fairneſs of the Repreſentation, than the Cauſe of my Friend. And if there's any favour allowable, it ſhall go to him that is ſo unhappy to be accuſed when abſent, rather than t'other that takes the worſt time to do it. How do I know what ſtroke Paſſion or Miſtake may have in the thing? As Charity ſhou'd begin at home, it ſhou'd make the firſt Viſit to our Friends.

And where's the great hurt of all this Niceneſs, if we cou'd get People to practice it? If thoſe that take Pleaſure in traducing our Friends, found no Credit to their Accuſations, the great damage wou'd be, that evil-ſpeaking might chance to be laid aſide. Converſation might go upon a

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better bottom, and uſeful Subjects of Diſcourſe be thought of. And to mention one ſingle Effect of this, it wou'd deliver People from the impertinence of thoſe Intruders, who think themſelves acceptable for the Faults they ſpy, and the News they bring.

To return to our buſineſs: If we take the freedom to condemn Strangers upon Suppoſition the Charge is good againſt 'em, ſhall we ſhew no more favour to our Friends? Though to ſpeak the truth, 'tis not generous to uſe one ſo more than another. And Juſtice is Juſtice with a Turk as well as one's Father.

I wou'd not act upon the Notion ſome Men entertain, that we may let our Cenſures looſe upon Strangers, who poſſibly make a conſtant Practice of doing ill. Suppoſing it ſo, give the worſt their due; Charge 'em not with more, only becauſe they are overloaded already. That which ſhou'd make us backward to believe ill of our Friends, is, that we have found 'em good, or we wou'd not have ſtruck up an Alliance with them. And this very Reaſon turns to their diſadvantage when we come to blaming 'em. It ſhou'd ever be remembred what a Friend confeſſes,

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he World have a Right to build upon. f I muſt be ſevere with ſome Body, and ut on an Air of Uncharitableneſs, I'll di- truſt the Author of any Report, conclud- ng there are in the World more malicious han good-natur'd Motives to find fault.

The Conduct propoſed has all this to recommend it: An endeavour to make a Man innocent is kind; to defend him, s generous. To be ſlow in paſſing Sen- tence is a part of Equity. The other Duty of Friendſhip in the Caſe of an Ac- cuſation is this: That after having heard his Defence, and finding nothing ſuffi- cient to clear him, we ſhou'd paſs Sen- tence without aggravating Circumſtances, with as much favour as we can. Let it be pronounc'd with regard to that ſame Principle of Self-love which wou'd have been ſo ingenious to defend our own Failings. Let Juſtice have its due. We may do it with Regret. And by the Balſam of Friendſhip heal the Wounds ſtrict Juſtice has made. Great Men have had their Failings. All are born to Shame and Repentance. Let us remember what he has done well, and ſupport a ſinking Character by the Glory of former Merit. Let his own Deſerts, and his

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Neighbour's Example, ſhelter him as much as may be.

There are certainly Ways of keeping up a Converſation without meddling with the Failings of a Friend. But methinks it ſhou'd rather be becalm'd, than that we make Strangers acquainted with ſuch things, or ſo much as give our Thoughts upon the Matter, if ſome Body elſe Starts it. We may, and we ſhou'd ſometimes with thoſe we love, act a Part that looks like an Enemy: But it muſt be to their Faces, and in Private; never behind their Back, and before Company. The Shame a Man takes to himſelf when a ſingle Perſon obſerves his falſe Steps is ſufficient; he can never bear to have all the World know 'em.

To entertain People with ſuch Diſcourſe, is the way to fix in our Minds an ill Opinion of our Friends, which we ſhou'd watch againſt. And when we have given our ſelves this Liberty, we are unwilling to have the things diſprov'd. We are a little concern'd to maintain what we have reported. Thus from an indiſcreet Freedom, we may come at length to that which is Criminal. But ſuppoſing my ſelf ever ſo exact as to the truth

truth of what I report, ever ſo Candid in my Cenſures of the Matter, there's ill Nature enough in the World to improve it. We can ſcarce meet with a Company that won't make the thing worſe at the next telling. And will not our Friend be ſurpriz'd at the Aggravation, which we have been the cauſe of? One can't be too careful in ſhunning this Shipwrack of Friendſhip. This being an Offence ſo eaſily avoided, cannot be conſtrued to have a kind Intention, and muſt of neceſſity be taken amiſs. Rather, like Love, let Friendſhip be blind, than quick-ſighted to ſo ill purpoſe. There's Enjoyment and Satisfaction, ſuch as it is, in ſeeing nothing that afflicts us. And though at the long run this blindneſs may be inconvenient, 'tis for the preſent quite the contrary. And that's more than can come of this Diſcerning Faculty, if we miſapply it to expoſe our Friends. There's neither preſent nor future good in that. I wou'd not have a Friend incapable of this Error, but One that ſhou'd be ſure to avoid it. How ſhou'd he do the buſineſs of a Friend, whoſe Eyes won't ſerve him to know when he's wanted?

Let us take Example by the blind Paſſion juſt now mention'd, ſo far as it's good. To talk of Faults no more than that allows of, but to ſee 'em as far as we can.

If we can't hit the *Medium*, we ſhou'd rather err on the ſide of ſeeing too little. Such a piercing Judgment might, methinks, be better employ'd upon one's ſelf. If ſpying Faults be our darling Exerciſe, let's look our own over again. 'Tis odds but ſuch a Method wou'd cure the Habit. For it's much to be fear'd, when we give our Neighbour more than his due, we keep not a ſhare for ourſelves. Thus may we become more perfect, and our Friends too leſs obnoxious. It was a generous pleaſure which *Pliny* the Younger took in laying hold of every occaſion to praiſe his Friends. He diſcover'd a Noble Diſpoſition, as well as Ingenuity, in his Diſcourſes of that kind. He carry'd the thing ſo far as to be blamed for it, to which he made this Anſwer, *I confeſs the thing, and am proud of doing it. For what can be more honourable than to err through excеſs of Bounty and Tenderneſs? Who is it that pretends to know my Friend*

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better than I do my ſelf? But ſuppoſing they do know 'em, why ſhou'd I be undeceiv'd ſo much to my diſadvantage? Whatever they are, 'tis mighty Happineſs I enjoy in thinking 'em ſo good. I wiſh thoſe Nice Obſervers wou'd beſtow their Skill where it will be better accepted. They may perhaps meet with ſome that are pleas'd with ſuch an awkward part. For my ſhare, I ſhall never be brought to think I love my Friends too well. He deſerves to find faithful Friends that loves 'em at this Noble rate: But alas, theſe Inſtances are rare! We have no ſuch high Notions of the Matter. We look at the Bulk of a Kindneſs, more than the Manner of doing it. And ſo indeed we chiefly ſhou'd. But why ſhou'd any thing be wanting that's in our power to add? Our Purſe or our Credit engaged for a Man goes for a great deal; but the way of doing it may make the Kindneſs double.

And this is it that gives the Stamp of Friendſhip. Common Humanity, a Senſe of Mens Misfortunes, may move our Aſſiſtance. There is a ſort of Sympathy in every generous Mind, and ſometimes amongſt the Vulgar, which cannot without pain refuſe a Kindneſs.

Such Care has Nature taken to provide for the Miſerable. And ſometimes the Motive is nothing elſe but Vanity. When Men are leſs ſollicitous about being good, than appearing ſo; and act with a reſpect to their own Credit, rather than the other's Want. This Office exalts a Man, and gives him Opportunity to eſteem himſelf of another Mould than the Perſon he Relieves. 'Tis Great and Fine to have the Title of Benefactor; to protect the Unfortunate, and ſupport the Weak, carries a Name with it of greater value than the Expence he's at. To part with what we have to the Afflicted, amongſt the wiſer Sort makes a better Figure than to keep it.

Whereas the Services of a real Friendſhip put on another Mien. They are valued for the Zeal and Readineſs of the Giver, and the Joy with which he beſtows 'em. Another Man will ſtay till Opportunity offers it ſelf; but he will look for an Opportunity. He that Anſwers at firſt asking is reckoned Generous: But Friendſhip will not ſtay for asking. It puts us upon ſtudying where our Service may be uſeful, and reproaching our ſelves

ſelves for not gueſſing ſooner. 'Tis Crime enough to ſtay till a Kindneſs is ask'd, which we might have foreſeen wou'd be acceptable.

Such a Negligence as this gives too much colour of concluding we wou'd have refus'd, if we cou'd have found in our Heart. Our Eyes ſhou'd be open and intent upon the Occaſions of a Friend. 'Twou'd make a Man fear he has not deſerv'd a Favour, he muſt be at the Expence of asking.

There was never any Man merited Friends more than the Famous *Socrates*, and he had 'em, ſuch as they were. Not one of 'em ſaw his Nakedneſs in a very cold Seaſon, which there was none that cou'd not help him but ſaw. The Philoſopher was above complaining of his Rags, and ſo ſpared their Bluſhing for what they ſhou'd have prevented. Yet at length he let ſlip one Expreſſion, which they might have every one been aſham'd to hear; *I had bought me a Cloak if I'd had any Money.* This brought in Cloaks more than were wanted; but methinks the firſt came too late, and was far from repairing the Error. This Paſſage is worth keeping in memory. It is natu-

rally diſagreeable to a Generous Mind to be receiving Favours: And therefore ſhou'd the Giver ſtudy ſuch Genteel Ways of doing 'em as ſhall admit no denial, and make the Obligation due to the Acceptance. Friendſhip without this wou'd have nothing endearing in it. In the ordinary Courſe of Benefactions the Thanks are expected from the Receiver; in this Caſe from the Giver. The Reaſon is plain, becauſe there a Man takes what, ſtrictly ſpeaking, was no Debt: Here the Office is a due to Friendſhip. There we may with Juſtice expect to receive as much as we pay: Here the pleaſure of being Serviceable is abundant Satisfaction, and over-pays the Reckoning. Not that I wou'd have all acknowledgment laid aſide amongſt Friends; but that every one ſhou'd be ſenſible of his Obligations. Yet it were to be wiſh'd only as far as they are pleaſant. He may think of 'em as an evidence he is belov'd; without remembring them as a Debt he is uneaſie till he pays.

As that which is ask'd for loſes much of its value; ſo that which comes not immediately upon asking, is to be accounted nothing at all. Indeed it may ſome-

times

times happen we don't ſee where we are wanted. Every one knows his own Affairs better than any Friend can. Ignorance is allow'd a Reaſon, where we have not the Means of being better inform'd, and no otherwiſe. But whenever the Matter is clear'd up, we are unpardonable if we don't make amends by Diligence for the Overſight, and remove all Suſpicion of Indifference. When we prevent his asking, and our Aſſiſtance is beforehand with his Neceſſity, he will naturally forgive ſome Failures in the Execution. But to be ſlow after the thing is deſir'd, will but confirm the ſecret Reluctance with which he moved it, and make him conclude we are not hearty. This will be interpreted carrying things too far. For Friends ſhou'd be above ſuſpecting one another about Trifles. They ſhou'd be ready to forgive when ſtrict Juſtice is on their ſide. Some few indeed there may be found of ſuch Generous and Exalted Diſpoſition, ſuch Heroes in Friendſhip, whoſe Hearts move ſo regularly as to maintain a Correſpondence with all this exactneſs. Theſe we ſhou'd follow as cloſe as we can, but muſt rather admire their Progreſs, than

expect to come up to it. Our Rules muſt be calculated for the *Meridian* of lower Capacities. We muſt take Humane Nature as it is, and allow for the Littleneſs of our ſelves.

If we are ſincere in our Profeſſions, a great ſhare of this exactneſs will naturally follow. We ſhall endeavour to repair our former Failings, not ſo much to avoid being reproach'd by him we have neglected, as by our own Heart. We ſhall find in our Breaſt the Motive of Inclination ſtronger than that of Shame. And this it is that diſcovers who, and who only, are fit to be Friends. Not every mean-ſpirited Wretch that takes his Meaſures by Politicks and Profit; nor one that ſtudies nothing but his Eaſe, and pretences for leaving you in the Lurch.

A Friend muſt be Reſolute and Active both. If he has Intereſt any where, he employs it for you as well as for himſelf, and without any other Regret, than that he's no better able to ſerve you. He's afraid of laying out too much upon himſelf, but thinks he can never go too far in your Cauſe.

Theſe

Theſe are the Duties of Friendſhip, and they do indeed oblige us to a great deal. But we muſt conſider at the ſame time, there are many things which Friends are not allow'd to do for one another. There are Superiour Obligations to this of Friendſhip; and theſe muſt not be neglected for its ſake. We muſt have a care of confounding things; and go upon that we have a mind to do, rather than that we ought. Honour and Conſcience have a larger Sphere to act in. We muſt diſcharge our Obligations of every ſort. We muſt reckon our ſelves Men accomptable to a higher Power; and not ſuffer the Duties of Religion, of Civil Society, of Blood, and Alliance, to be ſwallow'd up in the Demands of Friendſhip. It is in exact and juſt Submiſſion to all theſe Obligations, that the Happineſs of particular Men, and the Peace of the World, conſiſts. And there ſeems to me no great difficulty in reconciling the Offices of Friendſhip with every one of theſe. They all move in Channels diſtinct from one another; and never interfere but through our Miſtakes. As a Father may be at the ſame time a Servant, and fulfil both parts without

neglecting

neglecting either. The Foundation of Friendſhip we have already laid in Virtue, and Virtue is the Common Centre of all the reſt. One Obligation takes Place but where another ends. If to ſhew my ſelf a Friend, I invade the Duty of a Subject, or a Son, I forſake my firſt Principle; for Virtue was the Guide by which I was to Steer. The Union and Correſpondence of Friendſhip, which we have a liberty of engaging in, cannot ſet aſide the higher and former Obligations of Religion and Virtue; and we need never be at a loſs to determine how far we may ſerve our Friends, if this Rule be follow'd. We are born Subjects, Sons, *&c.* but we make our ſelves Friends. The latter act but in the *Vacuum* which Prior Obligations have left. And whenever our Duty to our Prince, or our Family, calls us another way; when Honour, and Conſcience, Charity, and Humanity interpoſe; Friendſhip has no Claim.

It has been made a Queſtion, and Great Wits have taken either ſide of it; Whether a Man ſworn to Secrecy, is allow'd to break his Oath for the Advantage of his Friend; ſuppoſing his Life, or

or ſomething very Conſiderable, at Stake.

Thoſe that think it not binding, alledge, that the Promiſe was made upon other Suppoſitions. And if the Perſon had known before as much as he does ſince, he had never tied himſelf up. That all Promiſes imply a Tacit Reſerve of Things ſo extraordinary, and contrary to Engagements already entred into. Perjury (ſay they) is the Contempt of an Oath, defying the Power we call to witneſs. And this is without any premeditated Affront, but to prevent the Miſchief we ſhall be acceſſary to by this Surpriſe.

T'other ſide oppoſe it as a pernicious Principle, thus to diſpence with Engagements. 'Tis too late to talk of Conditions after you're abſolutely bound. At this rate we ſhall find no Oaths binding, where the Event is beſide our Expectation: And you break your Faith with the Impoſer, who cou'd have kept the thing in his own Breaſt; and there it had been ſafe. This wou'd overturn all mutual Confidence, and leave thoſe who are bound as much at liberty as before. Of what ill Conſequence is it thus to liſten to Self-love moving in our Friend's behalf, which in truth is at the bottom of your Scruples? After

After all, this is a Caſe rather fit to Exerciſe Mens Wits upon, than to Treat of as a Reality. Two or Three ſound Cautions will decide it, and blow away all that perplexes it. Lay down but in general, that ſerious Obligations are not to be enter'd into upon Trifles: But allowing the Reaſon of our Engagement to Secrecy to be weighty and juſtifiable, there's no great difficulty in determining thus: That if concealing the thing be manifeſt Injuſtice, as an Intention of Murder, or the like, and cannot otherwiſe come to Light, we are to Diſcover. That which is not lawful to Act, is not lawful to Promiſe. Unlawful Engagements bind to nothing but Repentance. Though by the way, we are to conſider Friendſhip has nothing to do in all this; and we may diſcover no more for the ſake of a Brother, than an abſolute Stranger; Juſtice being all that can bear us out. There have been, I am ſenſible, Notions of Friendſhip extended much farther than this allows, and they are defended by very great Names: But we ſhall find thoſe who advanc'd 'em failing in their reſpect to Prior Obligations. And that where they have enlarged the Building,

Building, they have laid their Foundation in another's Right. Upon the whole; we ſhou'd always carry along with us a high Veneration for Oaths and Engagements, and neither impoſe, nor comply with, 'em upon every trifling Occaſion. It abates of the Reſpect we ſhou'd pay 'em, when we make 'em ſo common; to bring 'em in upon every little Diſpute about Right and Wrong, and to determine property in Matters ſo inconſiderable as we do.

Nor are we to allow our ſelves in little Shifts and Equivocations. It wou'd ſuppoſe an Imperfection in the Power we call to witneſs, to be ſo trick'd and deceiv'd. The Honeſt Men of all Ages held ſuch a Practice in abhorrence. Ever ſince the Days of *Cicero*, the Hypocriſie of that General has ſtood condemn'd, who having agreed to a Truce of Thirty Days, made no ſcruple to Ravage the Country by Night. Another of 'em that ſaved himſelf by ſuch a Fetch, was abhorr'd by his brave Country-men for an Action ſo baſe. He was made Priſoner of War, but permitted to go to *Rome*, upon urgent Occaſions, as he pretended: Having given his Parole of Honour

Honour to return by ſuch a time. And ſo he did, take a turn in the Camp, and away again. Upon this Salvo he expected to be kindly receiv'd, as one that had paid his Duty to his Enemies and his Country both: But the Noble *Romans*, who valued themſelves upon their extreme Juſtice, and the ſimplicity of their Manners, deliver'd him up to make him perform his Oath, that their Nation might have no ſhare in the Infamy, and the Perjury be expiated in his proper Perſon. Far from this was the Brave, but I muſt ſay Miſtaken, *Regulus*, whoſe Memory is perpetuated by his firmneſs to the Obligation he apprehended himſelf under. In the firſt *Punick* War he was taken Priſoner: The *Carthaginians* finding it proper to offer Peace, or at leaſt Exchange of Priſoners, made Choice of him to go on the Errand. The Authority he had at Home, and Intereſt to perſuade, made them think the Negotiation muſt proſper in his Hands. Accordingly they told him they had ſo entire Confidence in his Honeſty, that they wou'd have no Mediator but himſelf: Adding withal ſevere Threats if he ſhou'd not ſucceed. Demanding upon

Honour

Honour he ſhou'd return a Priſoner, if he cou'd not effect the Buſineſs: And in that Caſe he had nothing to expect but a miſerable Death. Upon his Arrival at *Rome* he gave 'em an Account of his Embaſſy; and having related what he was to ſuffer if it came to nothing, concluded with his Advice, that they ſhou'd go on with the War, and refuſe the Exchange of Priſoners.

Having thus proved himſelf a good Commonwealths-man, his next Care is to ſhew himſelf an Honeſt Man. He wanted not thoſe who ſhock'd his Integrity; and furniſh'd him with Salvoes upon which he might come off: But he was Proof againſt the Entreaties of his Friends, and the Tears of his Family. He took cheerfully the Road to *Carthage*, and boldly faced the Tortures prepared for his Virtue: Which Action has to all Ages eſtabliſh'd his Memory. Not but after all we muſt call him Miſtaken. He perform'd to a Tittle the Obligation he apprehended himſelf under: But it was his Error to think the Love of his Country could Excuſe and Authorize premeditated breach of Promiſe. Faith with an Enemy is Faith ſtill, and not to be diſpenc'd with.

with. If we owe an Enemy no Truth, as ſome wou'd come off, yet ſurely we owe it to our ſelves.

Let the Bonds of Friendſhip be inviolable as far as we are free to engage our ſelves: But let not ſuch Engagements intrench upon the Prerogative of Religion and Common Juſtice. 'Twas wiſely ſaid of *Pericles*, *I'll be a Friend till I come to the Altars:* As acknowledging a Superior Reſpect there. Whatever goes farther becomes a Sacrilegious Contract.

Indeed a Secret committed to us under Promiſe of not betraying it, though without Oaths and ſuch ſerious Things, however binds a Man of Honour. It is in the nature of a Truſt, not to Employ, but Keep. And whenever he breaks in upon that Truſt, either to ſerve himſelf or his Friend, 'tis as much a Violation of Common Honeſty, as if he had robb'd him of a Sum of Money. His Breaſt, in ſuch a Caſe, is lock'd up, and ſhou'd open to none but him that has the Key, and committed the Treaſure to its keeping.

If I've a Hundred Pounds of another Man's Money in my Hands, and cou'd redeem with it the deareſt Friend I have in

in the World from the Gallies, it's not in my Power to employ it ſo. 'Tis none of mine to part with; I might as well break open a Houſe for the Sum. There may be a difference in the Puniſhment. If the Money was left with me without Receipt or Witneſs, the Law can't hurt me; but that does not make the Action leſs unjuſt. And ſo it ſhou'd be with things told us in Confidence. Whatever Service we cou'd do a third Perſon by revealing 'em, it is not at our Liberty. We may be ſorry we are tied up from aſſiſting him, as we ſhou'd be to be ignorant of his Diſtreſs. Friendſhip can no more Authorize Breach of Faith, than Robbing on the High-way.

Nor muſt Friendſhip, and a Reſpect to thoſe we wiſh well, give Place only to Laws Divine and Humane; and ſubmit to Claims of Right eſtabliſh'd by a higher Authority; but even thoſe Acts which are in a ſort Voluntary, muſt be under a Confinement to other Conſiderations. Our Duty to Civil Society, our Regard to the Intereſt of our Country, demand the firſt offer of our Service. And our Hearts are not to be united by the endearing Bonds of Amity, but ſtill with

a Reſerve for Prior Obligations. For Example: Allegiance to our Prince, and Love to our Country, which is wrapt up in the other, may call us to the Wars. And tho' the Hopes of our Family, and the Enjoyment of our Friends, oppoſe it, we make no ſcruple to Sacrifice all. There's nothing that the Virtue of former Ages has ſhin'd brighter in, than their Concern for the Publick Good. Nothing that their Philoſophers, their Orators, and their Poets, have more ſtrain'd their Wits to recommend. And yet their Heroes have outdone the moſt Elevated Ideas that were given 'em.

Codrus of *Athens*, when he was ready to give Battle to the *Dorians*, enquired of the Oracle what Succeſs he ſhou'd have? Anſwer was made him, if he Periſh'd, his Army wou'd be Victorious. This (as might be expected from the Superſtition of the Age) made his Enemies out of Fear, and his Subjects out of Love, equally tender of his Life. But he, good King, though worth Ten Thouſand of his People, deceiv'd 'em both; and getting into the Enemies Camp, pick'd a Quarrel with a Common Soldier, by whoſe Hands he died. And

by ſo Generous a Fall, gave Riſe to his own never-dying Fame, and the Greatneſs of his Country.

Nor is the Bravery of *Curtius* leſs to be admired, who, when the City of *Rome* was cleft by an Earthquake,and the diſmal Sight ſtruck all the Inhabitants with Horror, the Oracle was conſulted what cou'd be done to Avert this publick Calamity. The Anſwer (it ſeems) was this, That the Earth wou'd not cloſe till there was found a *Roman* that had the Reſolution boldly to leap in. *Curtius* no ſooner hears the thing, but he mounts his Horſe, and upon a full gallop throws himſelf into the Breach.

This is Proof enough the Notions of Honour in thoſe Days run ſo high, as to admit no Fond Paſſion a Competitor. Nay, ſometimes ſubdued even Natural Affection, and prevail'd with Men to tear aſunder their own Fleſh and Blood.

So *Brutus* Sentenced his own Sons to Death for Attempting to reſtore the *Tarquins*. Whether they were in the Right, or he, I don't diſpute: But notwithſtanding he loved them entirely, and in them placed the Happineſs and Support of his Family, he was inflexible

to the Impreſſions of Nature, and deaf to the Intreaties of all the People who moved in their Favour; and made them an Example, to keep others to his Intereſt, whom they might have ſeduced if he had ſpared 'em.

We need not go ſo far for Inſtances: *France* is not barren of ſuch Heroick Spirits, whoſe Bravery deſerves a Pen to deliver 'em to Poſterity equal to any of the reſt. 'Tis a Grief to me that the Glorious Actions of my Countrymen ſhou'd die, and be forgotten, for want of being tranſmitted by Abler Hands. And this ſhews how much our Men of the Sword are concern'd to Protect and Encourage Learning. That the Honour they obtain in the Field, may flouriſh in after Ages, and their Laurel be an Ever-green. We can bring abundant Proof that Great Souls have inhabited *France*, as well as *Greece* and *Rome*. That the Genius and Valour of thoſe Days, ſo much, and ſo deſervedly, admired, has ſhined as bright in ours. And Martial Glory is not extinct by the Deſtruction of thoſe Commonwealths.

Amongſt many other Inſtances, there is particularly one, the Remembrance of which

which is ever Grateful. Upon the Death of *Charles the Fair*, *Philip de Valois* claim'd the Crown as the next Heir Male. *Edward* the Third of *England* put in his Pretenſions for it. He was by his Mother *Iſſabelle* of *France* Grandſon to *Philip the Fair*. The *Salique Law*, to which the *French* firmly adhered, had indeed excluded the Females, but this he maintain'd did not affect his Title. He confeſs'd the Females cou'd not Reign; but yet that a Right might be conveyed through them. And thus he was the Heir Apparent. *Philip de Valois* on the contrary urged, The ſame Law that excludes Women, excludes thoſe that derive their Title from Women. It being impoſſible for a Perſon to tranſmit a Title, who never had it. And to decide the Matter, he Appeal'd to Precedents, That the Conſtitution was plainly for him. That from the beginning of the Monarchy there could not be produced one ſingle Example of any King that Reign'd in Right of the Females.

King *Edward* inſiſted upon his Right, and his Interpretation of the *Salique Law*. The Diſpute grew to that height, that the States of the Nation were Aſſembled,

and the King of *England*'s Ambaſſadors heard; who did their beſt to make out his Pretenſion; but it went unanimouſly againſt him. Some Years after he renew'd his Claim, and attempted by Force, what he cou'd not have by Fair Means. He made a Deſcent upon *France* with a Powerful Army. He ſat down before *Calais*, Summon'd it to ſurrender, and acknowledge him. After a long Siege he reduced the Town to great Diſtreſs, and had all things in readineſs for a General Aſſault. The Beſieged deſired to Capitulate; but he wou'd grant 'em nothing, unleſs upon one Condition, which he allow'd 'em Three Hours to conſider of; and it was, That they ſhou'd deliver up Six of their Principal Inhabitants in their Shirts, with Ropes about their Necks, to be hanged immediately before the Gates. He thought by this Severity to ſtrike a Terror into other Places; not Treating them as Enemies, but Rebels.

In this Extremity and Deſpair, Six Men, the Chief of the Place, preſented themſelves to the People, and offer'd to ſubmit to this Severe Demand of the Conqueror. They declared they were Happy

py that they were Perſons of that Rank he required; and ſhou'd die with Satisfaction enough, if they might ſave the Lives of their Fellow Citizens.

The Affection of the People, and Devotion to ſuch elevated Virtue, together with the Tears of their Relations, cou'd not prevail upon 'em to change their Reſolution; but they deliver'd themſelves up to the Beſiegers in the ſhameful Condition that was enjoyn'd, and the King commanded 'em to be hang'd accordingly. They went with Faces full of Joy, as if they were to Triumph rather than to Die: But before the Orders were put in Execution, his Queen by her Tears ſo moved his Heart, as to obtain their Sentence ſhou'd be remitted. I muſt ask the Reader's Pardon for being ſo long upon this Affair, which affects me to a degree more than ordinary.

The uſe I wou'd make of all this, is to ſhew how great a Reſpect Men bore to the Publick in former and better Times. How their Heroes, moſt juſtly Celebrated for Bravery and Vertue, cou'd offer themſelves up for the Service of their Country. And the Veneration in which our degenerate Age holds 'em, is a ſtanding Proof of their Tranſcendent Worth.

Though almoſt every Nation has had thoſe in eſteem who quitted the Intereſt of their Families, and Private Advantage, upon the Publick Accompt, every particular Man has not been of the ſame Mind. There are but too many Inſtances of thoſe whoſe Principles are to miſapply the words of that Philoſopher, who ſaid, He was Citizen of no particular Place, but of the World in general. His meaning, no doubt, was to provide againſt the Diſappointments of Life, by Prudent Reflections upon the uncertainty of all Humane Affairs. To diſengage his Affections when they were ſinking too deep, where they muſt be at length deceiv'd; which is no more than *to make the beſt of a bad Market:* But we are here ſpeaking of thoſe who make Choice of what he only directs us to bear when we can't help it. Such an Indifference to our Country were indeed worth the practiſing, if Men had no need of one another's Aſſiſtance. Then might they deſire to ſtand every one upon his own Legs, and ſeek no more than their own Private Advantage. But theſe Notions are impracticable, as well as ungenerous; ſo much above us, we muſt ſet 'em aſide.

A

A Man can neither live in Solitude like a wild Beaſt, nor in a Community, without doing as much for others as he expects from them. The Golden Age muſt be once more reſtored before we arrive at a tolerable Well-being, without a dependance upon one another. My buſineſs is with thoſe who are ſubjected to Laws, and are Members of a Society, where every particular is protected by the ſtrength of the whole; and is ſecure againſt a Force equal to himſelf, by the number of his Fellows; the whole Swarm engaging in the Quarrel. For Men ſo happily incorporated, it were madneſs to talk of throwing off the Common Bond, to be Citizens of the World in general. 'Tis no hard matter to make it appear, that every degree of Indifference to the good of the Community, and confining our Concern to our dear ſelves, tends to our own diſadvantage. 'Tis evident to all ſober and conſidering Men, that Government is of abſolute Neceſſity to the World. And the Wiſdom of its Inſtitution never more plainly appears, than from the Miſeries that follow upon it's Overthrow. When the Support and Strengthening of this is the

common Centre from whence we take all our Meaſures, we do our Duty, and promote our Intereſt. 'Tis a higher Obligation than that of Friendſhip, and they cannot fairly interfere. Whatever Friend expects we ſhou'd betray our Country to ſerve him, deſerves rather to be uſed as an Enemy. So thought *Brutus* in his Treatment of his Children. And others have writ after his Copy. There was a Perſon drawn into *Cataline*'s curſed Conſpiracy, for burning the City, butchering the Nobility, and overturning the Government; whoſe Father having found out the thing, revived an old Law to deliver his Country, which gave Parents a Power over their Children's Life: He ſtruck a Dagger to the Heart of him; which ſo terrified his Accomplices, as to make 'em deſpair of Favour and Forgiveneſs.

'Tis infallibly the Duty of Members of a Society to prefer the Publick Good to their own, or their Friends, Advantage. We ſhou'd look upon ſuch to be Common Enemies, who deſire to be ſerv'd to the damage of the Publick. We ſhou'd make no difficulty to deliver up any Traytor to our Country; and whatever

ever Deſign of that Nature is committed to us in Confidence, we are obliged to reveal it, that we become not Parties in the Miſchief. If this Rule were well follow'd, it wou'd prevent any ſuch Attempts. If a Villain thought thoſe he wou'd draw in obliged in Honour to diſcover, he wou'd be very ſhy of making his Propoſals. He may in Private form Plots, and deviſe Miſchief, but can't bring it to paſs without Company. And if he ſuſpects People have ſuch a Senſe of Honour to reveal the Matter, he'll ſtifle his Deſigns in the Birth.

Let none conclude, becauſe we are to Sacrifice a Private Friendſhip to the good of our Country, we are likewiſe to Sacrifice an Indifferent Perſon to our Friend. No: Faith with an Enemy is Faith ſtill; and ſo 'tis with a Stranger, and not to be given up to Inclination. We have already laid down, that theſe Engagements of our own making, have no Power to ſet aſide the Obligations of Common Juſtice.

'Tis a way ſome Men have of approving themſelves Friends at the expence of their Virtue. They wou'd enhance the price of their Affection to one, by invading the juſt Rights of another. No matter

matter to whoſe Prejudice, provided their Friends are the better for't: But this is beſide the Mark; Friendſhip muſt be Innocent and Pure. They miſtake the Matter, who look upon it as a Licentious Paſſion, which drives Reaſon down the Stream. Agreeable and Uſeful are not enough, but Honourable muſt come into the Compoſition. 'Tis a regular Movement of the Heart, advancing in Company, and by the guidance of Reaſon, towards that which is pleaſant and honeſt together. 'Tis no wonder to ſee a blind and eager Paſſion preſs forward without regarding what it tramples on. More certainly is to be expected from Friendſhip, which moves not upon Brutal Inſtinct, but proceeds upon Rules of Prudence and Honour, with which it firſt ſet out.

There may be more Joy in ſerving a Friend than a Parent, but we are not therefore to indulge it. We ſhou'd rather rectifie our Notions of Things; inſtead of following the Dictates of our Heart, when ſo unreaſonable, take pains in reducing it to what it ſhou'd he. Friendſhip may ſigh, but Duty muſt prevail. This is likewiſe to be obſerv'd with our Superiors

Superiors in every degree. The nearneſs which Nature and the Laws have made, is ever to be conſider'd; and to have its Place before Friendſhip is admitted. There are Engagements which Nature has laid upon us, and ſome that the Laws have inſtituted; both which claim a Prior Right, which is not in our Power to diſpence with for the ſake of our Friends. Authority muſt be kept inviolable. And it's for this Reaſon the Law has forbid Marriages with our near Relations. Becauſe as Marriage makes an equality, it wou'd overthrow that Reſpect and Diſtance which the Law has eſtabliſh'd.

I don't carry the thing ſo far as to maintain the Affection to our Relations muſt of neceſſity be greater than to our Friends; this is out of our Power. Merit, and therefore Love, are not at our Choice. A Senſe of Duty, or the Publick Good, may govern our Actions, but it cannot command our Inclination. It may be none of our fault that our Superiors are not capable of making as deep Impreſſions in our Heart as our Friends can: But it is our fault if we ſuffer thoſe Impreſſions to influence our Actions, and determine our Conduct.

Without

Without all diſpute, when the Intereſt of a Friend interferes with that of a Parent, the latter muſt take Place. If we can ſerve but one at a time, Duty and Honour muſt carry it, and ſet aſide the Engagements of Friendſhip, and our ſtrongeſt Inclination.

What ſhall we ſay of him that dying not worth a Groat, left his Wife and Daughter for a Legacy to his Friend? The Daughter to be his Wife, the Mother to be maintain'd by him. Which of the Two Friends is the moſt to be admir'd? The Teſtator had ſuch high Notions of Friendſhip as to leave the World with content, in Confidence of his Friend's Care, to whom he committed what was deareſt to him. On the other hand, to accept the Legacy was ſomething extraordinary. To acknowledge himſelf obliged by ſo firm a Confidence of the dying Perſon, he took both Mother and Daughter home to his Houſe. He maintain'd the Mother handſomely, and diſpoſed of the Daughter in Marriage the ſame Day with his own Daughter, giving them an equal Fortune. Here was Generous and Prudent together. He did the Part of a Friend, without

without forgetting that of a Father and a Son. For had he obſerv'd the Will to a Tittle, he had turn'd his own Mother out to preſerve his Friend's Wife; and to prefer his Friend's Daughter, robb'd his own. Friendſhip, if it aſpires to the place of Natural Affection, will deſerve to be wholly diſcarded. It can't diſpence with the Obligations of Honour and Juſtice: But leaſt of all for the ſake of thoſe Obligations we make our ſelves.

I foreſee theſe Limitations will meet with an Exception. To what purpoſe is Friendſhip ſtruck up with all theſe Reſtrictions? When Honour and Conſcience have made their Demands, what ſhare will our Friends have left 'em? But may it not as well be ask'd, What will become of them if Friendſhip engroſſes all? Muſt all that's Sacred give way to our own Inventions? When after all, ſuch a Friendſhip is not to be depended upon, which diſpences with higher Obligations. He that's a Traytor to one, will be ſo to another, when Intereſt veers about. Leſs Reaſon have we to confide in ſuch large Pretences, than in thoſe which act within the Sphere of Honour. Virtue we laid down at firſt to be the inducing Motive,

tive, and we muſt make the Progreſs agreeable. Men in Love give themſelves up to Appetite, without conſulting Reaſon; but Friendſhip is under the Reſtraint of Reaſon, and conſults what to indulge, and what to deny. 'Tis impoſſible to deſcend to Particulars, and provide for every Caſe. We muſt therefore content our ſelves with laying down ſome general Rules, which may be applied as occaſion ſerves. One of the principal is this, never to forget we are to ſerve our Friends, but not their Paſſions. As often as our Friend wants us, we are not to run, but fly, to his Aſſiſtance. Yet as ſoon as ever we find out his Expectations intrench upon Honour and Probity, we are obliged to retire as faſt. 'Tis enough that we love our Friends as our ſelf. If we are not to commit Injuſtice for our own ſake, no more are we to do it for another. Such an Affection as this is not to be truſted, becauſe 'tis Unnatural.

My Friend ſuppoſe has a Law-Suit going forward; I am not Judge of the Matter: But becauſe he thinks fit to undertake it, I preſume 'tis upon a good Foundation. I aſſiſt him with my Advice, and

and Purſe, and Countenance. This is the leaſt I can do. But if I ſuſpect it to be a Litigious Buſineſs, and come to be convinced there's no Juſtice on his ſide, I preſently withdraw my ſelf. I tell him fairly my Thoughts of the Matter, and do my utmoſt endeavour to perſuade him to what's reaſonable. If at laſt I can do no good upon him, I have no Remedy but to complain to himſelf; I can't do him a greater piece of Service than to hinder the progreſs of Injuſtice, nor my ſelf a greater than to have no hand in it: But tho' ſtrict Virtue in ſo unfortunate Circumſtances will not ſuffer me to engage in his Cauſe, ſtrict Friendſhip will not ſuffer me to expoſe him for it. I may, and I ought to take the Liberty of Blaming him, but then it muſt be in Private. Before others my buſineſs is to excuſe him as well as I can. And indeed to my ſelf I ſhou'd excuſe him, and entertain as favourable an Opinion of him as his Cauſe will bear. To Commence an unjuſt Proſecution, and purſue it when it appears plainly to be ſuch; to carry it on becauſe he has begun it, is an effect of Paſſion or Humour. One is a Weakneſs, t'other a Diſeaſe of the

Mind. 'Tis not as it ſhou'd be; but the Failing is a little to be attributed to Humane Nature. He's Humourſome or Sick to Day; I ſhall be ſo my ſelf to Morrow. Let us not ſee as he ſees, that is double. Let us deny him what he wou'd have, for his Judgment is amiſs, and his Reſolutions biaſs'd: But let us uſe him kindly; Time and Good Counſel may by degrees prevail. If we refuſe to put a Sword in a Mad-man's Hand to deſtroy himſelf, we do well: But if we give him Phyſick to diſpel the Fumes, we do ſtill better. Our Complaiſance might be the Ruin of him; but to deſert him in that Caſe were equal Barbarity.

This ſeems to be a juſtifiable Conduct towards him that is blinded by Paſſion. I can't for my Life ſubſcribe to thoſe who confound the Fault with the Perſon, and ſpare one no more than t'other. Give no Quarter to Vice, 'tis a dangerous Enemy; you can never be too ſevere with it: But be tender of the Perſon that is carried away by it. Remember the Caſe may be your own. He that wou'd have a Friend without Faults, muſt have one that's more than Man. There are Imperfections entail'd upon Humane Nature

The

The wiſeſt are thoſe who are ſenſible of their Failings; not thoſe who think they have none at all. 'Tis an admirable Maxim, *That Friendſhip is a Companion of Virtue, but no Partaker of Vice:* But it does not from thence follow we muſt preſently deſert our Friend becauſe he's in a Fault. We muſt diſtinguiſh Paſſion and Weakneſs from a Foul Crime and Corruption of the Heart. To fall into the Dirt is one thing, and to wallow in it another. Let us not be Over-exact, Virtuous beyond what Virtue demands of us. Why ſhou'd Friendſhip be turn'd out of Service, in which it is ſo often uſeful, and Paſſion be entertain'd in its room? When we have diſcharg'd what our Duty calls for, we may act the part of a Friend. Friendſhip has its Rights as well as Juſtice, tho' of an inferior Nature. Where one ends the other begins. And when there is no interfering in the Caſe, we are Over-nice if we are wanting to it.

By this Inſtance we may judge of the extent of a Generous Friendſhip; but I muſt take leave to mention one more, into which it may not be amiſs to examine, becauſe the Caſe frequently occurrs. A

Magiſtrate is to ſit Judge in his Friend's Cauſe, ſhou'd he decline it upon the Adverſary's Requeſt to do ſo? Or may he forbear to determine when it muſt be againſt his Friend? Or which is ſtill more, may he, againſt his own Opinion, inſiſt upon what makes moſt in his Friend's favour?

To the firſt of theſe may be anſwer'd in general; That Friendſhip, rightly conſider'd, does not make a Man decline his Duty for fear of being Partial. A good Man will do Juſtice without leaning to Inclination. Our Notion of Friendſhip has been ever to eſtabliſh it in Principles of Virtue; and ſo long there is no danger of a biaſs'd Judgment, and corrupt Determination. A Man of exact Honour wou'd not ſcruple to be Judge in his own Cauſe; and if there were reaſon, to give it againſt himſelf. He were unworthy of the Character, that wou'd not allow the Matter a fair Hearing in his own Breaſt, and afterwards condemn himſelf in Publick if he were in the wrong. And why may he not as well ſit Judge in his Friend's Cauſe, if it be his Office ſo to do? If a Magiſtrate owes all to Juſtice, there's no room for By-ends to be ſerv'd:

But

But he wou'd do nothing at all if he ſtood in awe of the ill Sences Captious Men might put upon his Actions.

There are ſome People ſo ſtrangely biaſs'd in their own Caſe, or their Friend's, that they can't ſee any thing that makes againſt 'em; nor judge fairly of the Matter: But this is a Childiſh Temper, and ſhou'd be conquer'd. 'Tis acting the Little Maſter when we are grown too big for it. In ſhort, every one in a Publick Station muſt ſtand Neuter between both Parties. This Neutrality alone can qualifie a Man for a Judge, to keep Juſtice ever in view, neither inclining to the Right nor the Left; for one may err on one ſide as dangerouſly as on the other. Some Men to avoid Suſpicion of Partiality, are ſure to be againſt their Friends; as others to avoid Unkindneſs, will right or wrong be for 'em. Where we do manifeſt Injuſtice to a Friend for fear of being thought Partial, we are in effect worſe than profeſs'd Enemies; for againſt ſuch every one is upon his Guard. Equity conſiſts in a perfect *Equilibrium*. It's hard, I confeſs, exactly to hit it; but we muſt do our beſt, and come as near as we can.

If a Man finds himſelf ſo entirely in the Intereſts of his Friend as to bend Juſtice in his Favour; or ſo much in awe of ill-natur'd Suſpicions, as to act to his Prejudice; 'tis the ſafeſt way to decline the Office: But methinks the ſame Principle of Honeſty that makes him acknowledge the Weakneſs, may as well make him ſubdue it, and carry the Ballance even. To conclude, We muſt neither be ſollicitors for our Friend to injure his Adverſary, nor be afraid to do him Right for fear of being charged with Partiality. If his Cauſe be juſt, why ſhou'd we not keep our Place, and determine on his ſide? If it appear otherwiſe, where's the honeſty of putting it to another that will favour him?

One of the *Grecian* Sages was in a great Difficulty when he was appointed with Two more to try One of his deareſt Friends. He examined the Matter very carefully, and cou'd not let his Friend come off, without forfeiting his Conſcience. Affection drew him one way, and Equity another; but however ungrateful the Office was, he reſolv'd to execute it: And this was the Expedient to trim the Buſineſs. He uſed his Intereſt

reſt with his Fellow Juſtices, and prevail'd upon 'em, when they gave their Suffrage, to put in a white Ball, which ſignified Abſolution, himſelf putting a black one, which condemn'd him. And upon the Scrutiny there being Two Votes againſt One, the Accuſed Perſon came off. By this Ingenious Device, it ſeems, he ſaved his Friend and his Conſcience both: Satisfied Juſtice and Friendſhip at once. What was this now but Tricking and Evaſion? As if what a Man does by a round-about Way was not his own Act and Deed. Where's the difference in deceiving Juſtice my ſelf, or ſetting others to do it? If Equity may be Sacrificed to Friendſhip, ſuch a Practice is allowable; if not, the thing is worſe than to have openly defended his Friend; as it involv'd others in the Guilt, and gave an Example of perplexing Juſtice.

The Second Queſtion is, Whether a Judge may go honourably out of Court when his Friend's Cauſe comes on, to ſhun the diſagreeable Office of giving Sentence againſt him? Here we ſuppoſe a ſufficient number of Judges left to conſider the Matter, and make a Determination. No Body can make a doubt

of his Obligation to continue upon the Bench, if there be not a *Quorum* without him. But may he not uſe that liberty when there is? No; for Friendſhip has no admittance into Courts of Judicature, to turn the Scale one way or other, as this, if it ſignifies any thing is intended to do. They that are of another Opinion, may pleaſe to conſider, That the Office of a Magiſtrate engages him at all times alike. It's not a Matter of Choice whether he ſhall act as his Place requires. When he took upon him the long Robe, he Covenanted with Juſtice to obey her without Reſerve. He has made himſelf the Mouth of the Law, and muſt ſpeak when and what it dictates. Where-ever Juſtice does not forbid his Attendance, ſhe exacts it. So the Prætor of *Rome* conſtrain'd Arbitrators to determine, when the Parties had agreed to a Reference and they had taken it upon themſelves.

It were too great Severity for the Law to impoſe this upon a Man, when there's no occaſion for it; but when there is it is not to be diſpenc'd with. The Law is Wiſe, but not Barbarous. When it calls upon a Judge to do the Office upon his Friend, becauſe Juſtice will not other-

wiſe

wiſe be done, no other Conſiderations can honeſtly divert him: But to appear upon the Tribunal only to pronounce Sentence againſt his Friend, Equity no more demands than Natural Affection. It were Inhumane to thruſt himſelf in only for the ſake of condemning one he loves, when there's no need of his Aſſiſtance. 'Tis a very different Caſe when a Man has already accepted the Employment, and wou'd withdraw himſelf for fear of doing Juſtice upon his Friend. By taking his Place amongſt the reſt, he is bound to give Sentence one way or other. And if he declines Juſtice, he commits Injuſtice. The Party aggrieved is made a Sacrifice to his Private Engagements. Who knows but quitting the Bench may have an Influence upon the reſt, who were diſpoſed to act honeſtly if his Example did not diſcountenance it? Or there may want but one Voice to carry the Buſineſs for him that has the Right. With what Face can a Man ſhip his Neck out of the Yoak, when he has made ſolemn Promiſes to the contrary? He is not fit for ſo weighty a Charge who has not the Command of himſelf; but he that lays aſide Partiality, without Prejudice

Prejudice or Favour, is equally ready to Acquit or Condemn. If you withdraw your ſelf, 'tis a Confeſſion to the World you went not thither with a Candid Intention. Will not every Man conclude you regard Friendſhip more than Juſtice? An Accuſation a wiſe Man wou'd avoid even the appearance of.

The third Difficulty I propoſed to conſider ſeems to have the leaſt weight in it of all: But as it's maintain'd by ſome, ſhou'd have ſomething ſaid to it; tho' to ſpeak the Truth, Doctors often differ upon the Score of Intereſt; and a Caſe may be clear enough notwithſtanding a multitude of Oppoſers. 'Tis a uſeful Remark that a Judge in the Courſe of his Reading made, where Lawyers had taken a thing different ways, and had defended their Opinion ſo as to perplex the Cauſe, this Prudent Perſon makes a Note upon't in the Margin, *A Queſtion for a Friend:* Which is to ſay, This may help out a Friend at a dead lift. He might with ſome pretence warp Juſtice in a Man's favour when the Buſineſs wou'd bear Canvaſſing, and ſomething might be ſaid on t'other ſide. We are mighty clear-ſighted when things make for us, and ſtrangely dull

dull when they are againſt us. Intereſt has a vaſt ſtroke in the Judgment of our Mind. It ſtarts Difficulties in the Truth, and palliates the Deformities of Error. And when we have Company on our ſide, we are modeſt to a high degree. What, ſhall the Opinion and Practice of ſo many Great Men go for nothing? Shall we ſet our ſelves up to be wiſer than our Betters? Our Reſpect to Authors is never ſo well maintain'd as when they ſpeak in our favour. Then we are willing to ſtrike Sail, and lay our former Apprehenſions at the Feet of Authorities. And how can a Man give better proof of his Wiſdom than not to be conceited? Than to take wiſer Heads for his Guide in a modeſt diſtruſt of himſelf? To diſſemble one's Opinion for Diſputation's ſake is allowable in the Schools, to exerciſe the Faculties of Boys, and ſharpen their Wits. Where Talk is the buſineſs of the Place, and it goes no deeper, there let every one take up and maintain an Opinion at pleaſure. But in the ſerious Affairs of Life there ſhou'd be no trifling at all. What's good enough in Jeſt, makes very ſad Earneſt. A Judge muſt conſider the Charge he is in, where Juſtice

Juſtice is to be aim'd at, not Banter, and Trials of Wit. 'Tis not what he wou'd have that is to determine him, but what he can juſtifie. His Conſcience is to govern him, not his Inclination. 'Tis not his offering Authorities againſt the Right that will bear him out, if he thinks the direct contrary. He can't indeed conſult other Men too much, and make uſe of thoſe who have gone before him: But if by the Reaſons they offer he be not convinced, their Vote will never acquit him of Injuſtice, when he has not the Courage to be of his own Opinion. And ſo in one's own particular Caſe, to take any ſide againſt one's Judgment, becauſe there are Great Names to defend the wrong: To do this, I ſay, for any Intereſt, ſmells very ſtrong of Diſhoneſty.

But if a Judge, who is but Interpreter of the Law, be thus tied up to a ſtrict Obſervation of it, does it follow that the Prince, or Supream Power, have no liberty of varying from it? As the Prince is the Law-maker, and Offences are committed againſt him, it may ſeem he is not obliged to go always by the Rules he has appointed for thoſe he Commiſſions. No more indeed is he where the Letter of the

Law

Law is ſet up againſt the Reaſon of it, for that's the worſt Sort of Oppreſſion. But Juſtice is the ſame in whatever Hands 'tis Adminiſtred: And he that eſtabliſhes good Laws for the Preſervation of it, has not from thence any Power indulg'd him of overthrowing it when he pleaſes.

Philip of *Macedon*, who left his Great Son a Pattern of Princely Temper, ſhewed it in keeping up the Honour of his Station. One of his Favourites Petition'd him in behalf of his Father, who ſtood condemn'd for ſomething he had done: He who at other times might have done much, cou'd not then prevail, tho' upon his Knees, to have the Sentence revers'd: But the King, with a Reſolution becoming his Place, made anſwer, *I wou'd rather have your Father diſgrac'd than my ſelf.* Happy had he been if he had kept always to this Maxim; it coſt him his Life when he forgot it. For *Pauſanias*, a Young Gentleman in his Guards, having complain'd of an Injury from ſome of the Courtiers, and finding no Redreſs, reveng'd it not upon the Man that did it, but upon him that denied him Juſtice.

It's

It's none of my Buſineſs to ſet Bounds to Princes, and determine how far their Favours may extend. 'Twas long ſince well ſaid of one that was a Compleat Courtier, as well as a Sage Philoſopher, *There's ſomething of Pride in Teaching our Maſters; they are better Inſtructed by paſt Ages, than by Leſſons of our giving.* This is indeed a proper Glaſs to ſet before 'em; that by ſeeing what Sort of Perſons have been held in Veneration, and obtain'd a laſting Memory, and what thoſe were who are remembred with Horror and Contempt, they may know what to Avoid, and what to Imitate. But after all, they may want Friends to do this for 'em; and if they have Friends, they may hear the Truth without going ſo far about for it. Let it not paſs for an Abſurdity, that I ſay, if they have any Friends. For 'tis a Queſtion whether they can have any that are truly ſo to the degree that Private Men may. For there are ſome Enjoyments like the Growth of a particular Climate, almoſt appropriated to a meaner State. Friendſhip no more than Sleep is ordinarily an Inhabitant of Palaces. If we conſider on one hand the Duties which Friendſhip

ſhip exacts, on t'other the Diſtance which is due to Majeſty, there will be ſome difficulty in conceiving how Awe and Freedom can ſubſiſt together.

'Tis urged, That Friendſhip demands a Familiarity, Confidence, and Frank Behaviour; Majeſty expects Submiſſion and Reſervedneſs. A Prince that gives his whole Time to Affairs of State, has not leiſure to attend the Offices of Friendſhip, and diſcharge the Part it requires. And what Advantage Private Men have from Friendly Admonitions, and the like, he may challenge upon the Score of Duty. Not to mention the great hazard of loſing our Pains, and ſometimes our Heads, for telling thoſe bold Truths he don't care to hear. When eſpecially he is blown up with Flattery, and drunk with Applauſe, will he quit a pleaſing Opinion of himſelf, for the bitter Draughts which Friendſhip preſcribes? Can one ſay what's grievous, and be taken for his Friend? And can one be his Friend without ſometimes doing ſo?

Nor is this all. There are a Thouſand other Difficulties, if theſe could be ſurmounted. He that is a Friend to a Prince, muſt in courſe be an Enemy to his

his deſigning Courtiers. All the Credit that ſuch a Man obtains, they look upon as ſtoln from them. Their Intereſt muſt ſuffer an Eclipſe by ſuch an Interpoſition. The moſt ſincere Remonſtrances will by them be conſtrued Inſolence and Reflection. He makes himſelf a Publick Mark that takes ſuch a difficult Part upon him. If the Truth he offers will not bear diſputing, he's charged with telling it out of Peak. If his Virtues are not to be ſhaken, they'll throw in ſome Vices to ſet againſt 'em. Nay, if his want of Underſtanding can't be blamed, 'twill be a Crime that he has too much. It ſhall be inſinuated, This is Schooling of Princes, and putting them in Leading-ſtrings; as if they were very weak Men, who ſtand ſo much in need of Aſſiſtance; and the Credit of what they do their Adviſers muſt run away with: That 'tis Vain-glory, not Friendſhip, puts Men upon doing things out of their Sphere; or perhaps Malice againſt ſome Body that moves 'em. 'Tis hard for innocent Friendſhip to ſubſiſt amongſt Paſſions of Prey. It ſeems rather the Lot of Equals, where Intereſt and Malice are not Aſſociated to diſappoint it. Virtue and Fortune have been

been ever at defiance. Thoſe that take the Part of Virtue, are not like to find Quarter amongſt the Adherents of Fortune. Hence it is the Services of Friendſhip will be interpreted amiſs by thoſe who have an Intereſt to Court, which makes it hard for Great Men to have true Friends. It was well ſaid by *Dionyſius*, in his Diſgrace at *Corinth*, *Many are the Evils that ſurround a Throne; the worſt is, that of all that call themſelves Friends, there is not one will ſpeak the Truth with Freedom.*

Of all this one can make no more, than that Friendſhip enjoys the greateſt Tranquility in a lower Sphere. That to make it ſafe and uſeful, it ſhou'd be ſet as much as poſſible out of the Way of Intereſt. But we are not to conclude it impracticable in Palaces; and the Noble Uſes to which it may Adminiſter there, may allure the moſt Generous Ambition. The Heroes of the Poets in their Deſcriptions are ſet out with the Accompliſhment of Friendſhip to compleat their Glory.

If a Man conſiders the Nature of Friendſhip, he will not find reaſon to pronounce a Sovereign Power incapable

of it. The Neceſſary Principle of Friendſhip is Eſteem, and of that Virtue is the Ground. And I hope no Body will exclude Princes from being Virtuous. And why may not they on the other hand ſee Amiable Qualities in their Subjects? If then Friendſhip be nothing elſe but the Union of thoſe who love one another, who love upon a true Foundation, there's none too big to be admitted to it. The only conſiderable difference that appears to me between the Friendſhip of a Prince and a Private Man, is this; That the latter may engage himſelf with greater Confidence, whereas a Prince can't do it with too great Caution. For as he ſees with other Mens Eyes, 'tis impoſſible he ſhou'd be ſo well inform'd of his Subjects Merit as thoſe who converſe freely with 'em. Whereas he being ſet in a higher Place, his Actions are more eaſily diſcern'd. It's true, Subjects are apt to form themſelves after the Model of their Prince. If he gives an ill Example, they follow it by Authority. If he be a Favourer and Practicer of Vertue, his Courtiers are Courtiers enough to make a Virtuous Appearance, tho' it goes no farther than outſide.

They

They ſeem what really they are not. And how ſhall he diſtinguiſh between Hypocriſie and a ſincere Behaviour, who ſees at ſuch a diſtance? By what Means ſhall he come to an underſtanding of their Merit? He can hardly conſult any but thoſe whoſe Intereſt may be to conceal the Truth, or whoſe Care has not been to inform themſelves. If an Envious Perſon be ask'd, he ſuppreſſes the Man's Virtues as much as he can. If he asks a Friend of him that he enquires about, that Friend ſuppoſes well. If he asks one that's no way concern'd, he may know nothing of the Matter.

This ſeems to be the chief Difficulty. As to the reſt, Diſtance and Reſpect may be well enough maintain'd with Care, whilſt a true Familiarity and Confidence are let in. If the Prince be ſo happy to make a good Choice, he may reckon ſafely upon the reſt. A Royal Breaſt may be ſenſible of the Raviſhing Pleaſures of Friendſhip, and find there a more compleat Satisfaction than State and Gaudy Greatneſs can afford. And then he will ſtoop from his Throne for the Entertainments of Friendſhip; and far from thinking he leſſens himſelf by ſuch a Fa-

miliarity, he will diſcover no Senſe of his Condeſcention, unleſs by his obliging Pains to make them forget it. He will appear a King only by his bringing the greateſt ſhare into the Partnerſhip. They will feel his Power in his Bounty alone; and far from abuſing the Freedom he allows, his familiar Carriage will improve their hearty reſpect to his Perſon. *Alexander* was without doubt a Prince that of all others kept up the Majeſty of Sovereigns. He diſdain'd to enter the Liſts but with a crown'd Head. When he was poſſeſs'd of his Father's Throne the whole World was too ſmall for his Ambition; and yet he diſdain'd not Friendſhip. His dear *Hepheſtion* was ever near his Heart, and ſhared all his Secrets. Far from being Jealous the Rights of Sovereignty were thereby invaded, he was pleas'd to ſee his Friend partake of his Honours. Hiſtory gives us a ſufficient proof of this. When *Darius* was defeated, the Mother and Wife of this unfortunate Prince were Priſoners in *Alexander*'s Camp, he thought it become a Generous Conqueror to treat his Royal Captives with all Marks of Civility; he went, with all his Court attending him, into

into the Tent where they were. They not knowing his Face, miſtook *Hepheſtion* for him, and threw themſelves at his Feet. The manner in which he receiv'd them, ſoon gave 'em to underſtand their Error. *Siſſigambis* the Mother excuſed it to *Alexander* as done by Miſtake: But to ſee his Friend took for a King, pleas'd him more than to be himſelf reckon'd a Subject grieved him. He anſwer'd with an Air of Delight, *Madam, you are in the right, this is* Alexander *too.*

Examples of this kind are rare. In turning over Hiſtory we find more Monarchs that have imitated his Valour than his Friendſhip. 'Tis ſomething leſs to cut a Way to Greatneſs thro' Danger and Difficulty, than to ſtoop from that Greatneſs when attain'd. Nature puſhes Men forward to bold Attempts, to gratifie an Inbred Ambition of getting above others. But Condeſcentions are againſt Nature: There's Self-denial in exalting thoſe to an Equality who were Born below their Rank. To make *Alexander* from King of a ſingle Country, the Maſter of the World, his unlimitted Ambition was ſufficient. Together with the Hardineſs Nature had

furniſhed him, and the favourable Conjunctures Fortune had thrown in his way: But to make of ſo Great a Conqueror a Man that had a reliſh of Friendſhip, and wou'd act his Part in it, there was ſomething more requiſite, no leſs than a Noble Improvement of Reaſon. What I have ſaid comes to this, that it is not Impracticable for Princes to partake of the Delights of Friendſhip: That they may find their Accompt in it as it's highly uſeful and agreeable. But the Perſons that wou'd prove Friends to 'em, undertake an Office that's like to have in it more Danger than Profit. This muſt paſs for a Paradox amongſt the Ambitious. They place the Sovereign Happineſs of Life in the Bounties of Fortune, and how then can they imagine Friendſhip with a Crown'd Head can be a Burthen? Our Buſineſs is not with them, but others who enquire into the Obligations and Uſe of Friendſhip. Virtue is the Star by which it governs its Courſe, whilſt others look only at a preſent Intereſt, and they are therefore unworthy of Friends, and unfit to be ſuch. I will not be ſo ſevere as to exclude the Ambitious, becauſe all Vicious Perſons are excluded:

cluded: But for once will ſuppoſe Ambition accompanied with Innocence. Tho' for the moſt part it is more intent upon the probable Means of arriving at its End than the honeſt Ones. Admitting it may be otherwiſe, methinks it is not ſafe to make the Experiment. We may fairly be aware of thoſe Qualities which belong to the Character. 'Tis not Wiſdom to promiſe our ſelves more than the nature of things gives us encouragement for. The Rule may fail, but who wou'd venture upon no better Grounds?

Tho' ſuch a one be a good Man, he is not a proper Partner of our Heart. You may depend upon his Sincerity, but you can't hope for the ſweetneſs of a Friendly Correſpondence. How ſhou'd he that's wholly taken up with the Thoughts of advancing himſelf, afford time to think of the Intereſts of his Friends? To prevent their Neceſſities by Offers of his Aſſiſtance? To find out Ways to divert their Spleen? To take their Burthen upon his own Shoulders? They who doat on Fortune as the Miſtreſs of all they Covet, can ſpare no Time nor Pains to any Nobler Purpoſe. They can't Sacrifice that to their Friends which is dearer to

them, and looked upon as more neceſſary of the Two. As long as things go well with you, and you may be ſerviceable to them, they love you out of Promiſe and Intereſt both; but the Paſſion cools upon a Diſappointment. Where Virtue is not the only Bond, the Union decays upon every Accident. You fall into Diſgrace; 'tis a warning for your Friends to leave you. Such Friends I mean as you took with an Incumbrance of Ambition. The Unfortunate, like a wounded Deer, is ſure to be left alone. Then it's preſently pretended, a Man can't be unhappy but he muſt have deſerv'd ill. If he have diſobliged ſome Great Man, or loſt a Place at Court, 'tis not Prudence to keep up our Acquaintance. Who knows but we may be brought in as Accomplices? At leaſt we muſt be Sufferers if he ſhou'd come to want us. One can't make too much haſte out of ſuch Company, nor too loud a Profeſſion of our Abhorrence when we leave it.

And when you have run your ſelf upon a Precipice to ſerve ſuch a Friend, when you come to be hunted by thoſe he ſtands in awe of, you can expect no more than that he ſhou'd be ſorry for having

having drawn you in; that when he abandons you, it ſhou'd be with a Sort of Regret.

How does ſuch a cool Behaviour come up to the Demands of Friendſhip? Which if real, is the moſt ſprightly, and ſhines the brighteſt in a time of Diſtreſs, which can never be broke to the Yoak of Ungenerous Politicks. 'Tis Prudent, and not Fool-hardy making a Man run his Head in the Fire; but it is Undaunted too; and when there is juſt occaſion to ſtand out, will ſneak to no Man living. A true Friend will venture falling himſelf, rather than not ſuſtain you; and will gain by his Credit and Fidelity that Eſteem and Approbation which an Ambitious Perſon wiſhes for, but will not be at the Pains of deſerving.

'Tis beyond diſpute, Friends ought to eſpouſe one another's Quarrel, and maintain one another's Cauſe, as far as Juſtice will bear 'em out. Not that I think 'em bound blindly to engage in every thing that an Impertinent Caprice has rais'd. We are, as I ſaid, to ſerve our Friends, but not their Paſſions. When they're in the wrong, all that lyes upon us is to bring 'em off as well as we can. I ſup-

poſe

poſe all along there's no manifeſt Injuſtice on their ſide, but that 'tis Intereſt, Prejudice or Ill-Will, in the other Party; and if ſo, we are to take up the Quarrel heartily againſt Great or Small. If the Union makes of Two but One Heart, by Conſequence there muſt be but One Intereſt. Fortune, Reputation, Credit, and all, become the Common Stock of Friendſhip. When my Friend is attack'd, I am attack'd too: What is taken from him is my Loſs. Running to his Aſſiſtance, is running to my own.

There is yet a difference to be made between his Cauſe and our own. Our Diligence and Attention is then all required; we are to be almoſt implacable in his Quarrel. The liberty we take in our own Caſe of purſuing an Advantage, or quitting it, of being Rigorous or Indulgent, is not allowable there. He is there to Moderate, and not we. What is remitted muſt be his Offer; 'tis not our Buſineſs to foreſtal it. *You ask for my Friendſhip*, ſaid *Pliny* to a very Great Man, *and you ask it after having barbarouſly treated* Mauricus, *my intimate Friend. You deſire me to receive your Excuſes; he's returning from his Exile; I ſhall wait for his coming;*

ing; till then I can give you no anſwer. Let him reſolve upon what he pleaſes, I am to be determined by him. This was a Generous and Manly Spirit, above the Eaſie Compliance and Criminal Moderation of Vulgar Souls, who can Trim between different Intereſts, and Satyr-like blow hot or cold, as it ſuits with their Convenience. So much of the Politick eats up Friendſhip. When a Man can look pleas'd upon him that wou'd cut his Friend's Throat, ſuch Temper and Meekneſs betrays a narrow Soul, and mean Spirit, more than what it pretends to, extream good Nature. That's the Way indeed to keep up a Character in the World, to command the Hats of the Multitude, but not to deſerve the Heart of a Man of Honour. Such a one wou'd make an extraordinary Politician, a ſupple Courtier, but is worth nothing for a Friend. Reſpect to Time, Place, and Perſons, is a Point of Prudence, which wou'd keep our Blood always cool: But a Sincere Friendſhip may be ſometimes excuſed if it breaks in upon theſe, if it err in Point of Diſcretion rather than of Courage.

Such

Such a Friendſhip as this the *Scythian* meant, who to ſet himſelf forth, and deſerve a Royal Miſtreſs better than his Rivals, ſaid, *I am greater than any of 'em. It's true, I have not ſuch a Fortune to boaſt of, but I have Two Faithful Friends.* This Man had a good Notion enough of Friendſhip, that it was really to be preferr'd to Money, and all the World beſides: But to make out his Pretenſions, he ſhou'd have had his Two Friends there to have ſeconded him; otherwiſe Money wou'd buy Friends, tho' not of the right Strain, yet as good as thoſe who did not appear at ſo Critical a Time. He that has Two Faithful Friends is rich enough; but he's an unhappy Man that reckons upon Two ſuch as neglect him when they're wanted.

The Famous Tyrant of *Syracuſe* was very ſenſible of this; all that his Cruelty and Violence cou'd make him Maſter of, was not enough to ſupply the want of Friends, but he was poor in the abundance of all things. He fear'd every Body, becauſe every Body fear'd him, and conſequently hated him. Virtue cou'd not be ſafe near a Man of his Character, when it was ſuſpected by him ſome Miſchief follow'd.

low'd. There was one *Pythias* upon ſome ſurmiſe or other condemn'd to die; all the Favour he ask'd, (for he had not much to hope for) was a little time to put his Affairs in order, promiſing to return upon the Day appointed; and offering to bring a Friend for his Bail, who wou'd be content to ſuffer in his room if he fail'd. A Confidence ſo extraordinary moved the Tyrant's Curioſity; he call'd for the Friend who wou'd undertake for this: *Damon* (for that was his Name) came preſently and engaged Body for Body. Upon this *Pythias* was diſmiſs'd. He return'd not at the time fix'd, and *Damon* was accordingly led to Execution. He went with a Countenance ſerene and well aſſured; when on a ſudden *Pythias* came running to keep his Word with his Friend. The Tyrant being inform'd of it, ſends for 'em both, and charm'd with ſuch a conſtant Fidelity, releaſes the condemn'd *Pythias*, and entreats that himſelf may be receiv'd as a Third Partner of ſo glorious a Friendſhip. Their Anſwer was Brave as their Conduct; *You ſhall be taken in, provided you make your ſelf worthy of it.*

A N

AN ESSAY UPON FRIENDSHIP.

PART III.

IN the First Part we have Treated of the Nature of Friendship, the Qualities requisite to form it, the Precautions to be observed by those that engage themselves, and the Persons with whom they shou'd joyn. In the Second we went upon the Duties it exacts, and their due subordination to the Laws of of Religion, of Nature, and Civil Society. Our business in this is to examine what

what it is that can diſſolve the Union; what it is we are obliged to when we break off, and afterwards; and what when Death hath made a total Separation.

When Friendſhip is broken by fatal Neceſſity, by Cauſes that Humane Prudence cou'd not have prevented or foreſeen, there's no more in it but unhappineſs: But if they run themſelves into ſo miſerable Circumſtances when they might have avoided 'em, nothing can be ſaid in excuſe.

'Tis a ſad thing to think on that ſo valuable a Treaſure, ſo Sovereign Good, as Friendſhip, ſhou'd be ſo brittle. That the Fruit and the Reward of Virtue ſhou'd ſtand expos'd to the Caprice of Accidents and Fortune. 'Tis however too true. There muſt be a Concourſe of almoſt innumerable different Circumſtances to eſtabliſh a Friendſhip, and yet the leaſt thing in the World is often ſtrong enough to break it. It lyes at the Mercy of every Trifle.

Suppoſe Two Men under all the endearing Bonds of Friendſhip, the Father of one of 'em, upon ſome falling out, has a deſign to kill the Father of the other, here's

here's all the Cords of Friendſhip burſt aſunder. In vain does the Heart ſigh, in vain does Ancient Kindneſs plead, all muſt fall a Sacrifice to Irreſiſtible Duty. The Engagements of Affection, how Innocent ſoever, muſt give Place to a Superior Authority. This Man muſt without delay take advantage of the Law, that muſt as vigorouſly make a Defence. Or ſuppoſe your Son runs away with one of my Daughters, Debauches her, and Marries another of 'em, in ſuch a Caſe, if we love one another never ſo well, we take a Courſe as if it were againſt our Mortal Enemy; and who knows but neceſſary Proſecution may be improv'd into ſettled Hatred?

Tho' after all it's owing to Weakneſs that theſe things have any power over Friendſhip. They may be uſed for Inſtances of its being overthrown by ſuch Means; but were Friends as Generous as they ought to be, nothing of this cou'd happen. A Man is not fit to be a Friend that can't bear with another in a juſt Defence of his Family: Nor he that will defend a Fault becauſe it was committed in his own Houſe. Theſe are Misfortunes to which Humane Nature is

liable; but it is in the Power of a wiſe Man to conquer that Weakneſs which betrays him into it.

But far more inexcuſable are they who create Miſunderſtandings for want of due Care and Attention. Humane Weakneſs brings us into Faults enough, which are more eaſily forgiven than thoſe that are occaſion'd by our Vanity or Imprudence.

If we look into the Cauſes by which Friendſhip is at firſt ſhaken, and afterwards overthrown, we ſhall find them for the moſt part theſe: We are too ready to Hear, too ready to Believe, and too rigorous in the Amends we expect. Liſtning to ill-natur'd Stories, and concluding from 'em what he that Reports 'em wou'd inſinuate, firſt unſettles, and then throws down, a good Correſpondence.

One wou'd wonder at the Patience, or rather Satisfaction, moſt Men ſhew upon a Malicious Relation; not conſidering but themſelves may have been brought in too; or if not then, another time. We love dearly to feed our Curioſity at the expence of another's Reputation. In all we hear amiſs of them the Principle

Principle of Self-love finds Argument of Compariſon which redounds to our own Advantage: It being natural for us to meaſure our Happineſs and our Credit by the ſhare other Men have. We grow Rich by having their Poverty expoſed. We muſt be no Men if we are without this Natural Envy, or we muſt turn Philoſophers, and ſubdue it by a Courſe of Good Thinking. And for hearing Ill Reports of one's ſelf from ſuch Hands as the Common Chat, I can't ſee any Advantage in it. 'Tis a Mortification to think I am leſs eſteemed in the World than I imagined. And to talk of mending any Body by ſuch Sort of Managemen is fooliſh enough. Serious and ſincere Reproof is ſeldom very kindly taken; much leſs will Defamation work an Effect. I confeſs, rather than be thus inform'd of our Failings, we are happy not to know 'em. But it's neceſſary Men ſhou'd hear what's ſaid of 'em, that they may grow better. It's true; but let thoſe take the Office to whom it belongs. Few have improved upon being the Jeſt of a Company. Ignorance ſometimes, as often Malice, and moſt frequently Impertinence, is the Mover of this Sort of Diſ-

courſe; and what good can be propoſed from any of them? Beſides, Virtue is ſo often traduced at this rate, that there is no heed to be given, as Truth is always ſuſpected from an approved Liar.

There's but one way of making a Man eaſie in the World, and that is by *Pythagoras*'s Advice, *Above all to Reverence himſelf:* To ſtand leſs in Awe of flying Reports, than the Reproaches of his own Breaſt: To mind what he does, rather than what others ſay of him. It's true, Virtue wou'd have the Shadow of Honour, but the want of that is made up by Conſcience. If you muſt lend an Ear to Malice or Impertinence, beware of it however when your Friends are miſrepreſented; and believe no more than you have good Evidence for. 'Tis a Point of Generoſity, or rather Juſtice, to entertain a fair Opinion of Strangers, becauſe our Opinion affects our Actions: But to treat our Friends well, we are under an actual Engagement. We ſhou'd ever be arm'd with Reflections upon the Ill Nature and Folly of Mankind, and that may defend us againſt being too Credulous. If we ask our ſelves the Queſtion, Whence comes this forwardneſs to talk of Peoples

Peoples Failings? What good End can that Man have in what he ſays? We ſhall hardly be able to think of a good Reaſon. Is it Honour or Conſcience that puts him upon this? Can it be honourable to defame an abſent Perſon? What was ſaid might eſcape unadviſedly, perhaps in the way of Banter, not Earneſt. He confided in the Diſcretion of his Company, or he had been more exact. All this may be, and may be well enough excuſed. Whereas there's nothing to be ſaid for him that wou'd make Miſchief amongſt thoſe that Love: That wou'd have an eſtabliſh'd Friendſhip fall a Sacrifice to a little idle Diſcourſe. But he intends perhaps to ſerve me in it, by diſcovering the Failings of my Friend to prevent my Suffering by 'em. I'll conſider what Proofs of Affection this Man has before given me. What Reaſon have I to believe he loves me more than my Friend he does ill Offices to? And if he loves me leſs, why ſhou'd I give way to him againſt one that values me more? If I muſt either believe my Friend Perfidious, or miſtruſt the Report, I am rather for the latter. I'll examine the Man's Temper and his Character. 'Tis odds but I find (and

Charity here will make one Uncharitable) he's one that takes a pleaſure in finding fault: One that ſets about a Report out of ſome Intereſt he may have for himſelf; or perhaps out of Revenge for ſome Affront receiv'd. If we muſt give Things the hearing, let us however be ſlow in our Determination. If our Friend be accuſed of ſome little Matter, we ſhou'd paſs it by like the barking of a Cur, without taking any notice: If of ſome Capital Crime, we ſhou'd ſtill look upon the Author of the Report with a Sort of Deteſtation. 'Twas Generous, as well as Politick, in the Great *Pompey* to throw the Letters into the Fire without reading, in which he had an Accompt of his Friend's Treachery. Such an Act of Confidence wou'd aſſure thoſe to him who had thought of being falſe; and it wou'd ſave him the Regret he muſt have met with in breaking with thoſe he profeſs'd a kindneſs for. 'Twas extream Bravery in him, and worthy to be imitated.

Had he done otherwiſe, thoſe of 'em who were Innocent muſt have born the Diſgrace, and himſelf the Uneaſineſs, of having ſuſpected 'em. And thoſe he had found

found guilty, it wou'd have gone againſt him to throw off, becauſe in ſo doing he had condemn'd his own Choice in taking 'em for Friends.

As thoſe who dive into this Sort of Accuſations, and enquire for more, are Ungenerous and Imprudent; others that break with their Friends without a full Conviction, are farther guilty of Injuſtice and Barbarity. 'Tis not impoſſible, I confeſs, but there may be ſome Proofs of a Man's Inſincerity, to which the very naming is ſufficient. For Inſtance, the Secret of my Soul, upon which my Life depends, has been committed to one particular Perſon; whenever this comes abroad, one may, without the Oracle, be aſſured he is Falſe. In this Caſe I may very fairly break with him; but it ought to be without making the World acquainted with my Reaſon. Yet ſome things we are to obſerve, That we tell the Perſon himſelf we Renounce his Acquaintance; and this with as little Noiſe as may be; entreating him not to enquire into the Reaſons we go upon. And that ſince we don't give him Opportunity of a Publick Juſtification, we take the falling out upon our ſelves, that we be content

to be charged with being Fickle and Unſteady. Laſtly, That we concert Meaſures with him to lay as little Scandal upon him as may be, and leave him fair with others.

This is to be look'd upon as an Exception to the Rule; but in general we are never to break without full Conviction. Common Humanity forbids us to judge any Man unheard; and ſurely Friendſhip exacts as much. In this Caſe I make my ſelf a Party againſt my Friend; and if I ſet up a Party for Judge, the leaſt I can do is to give a fair Hearing. If we do err, let it not be in this Monſtrous Exceſs, but rather on the Right Hand. Let us take up all the Excuſes for our Friend that we wou'd make for our ſelves in his Circumſtances. Let us give his Juſtification all the weight that a Sincere Deſire to have him acquitted can ſupply. Nothing that will bear Two Senſes ſhou'd be interpreted againſt him. Every thing that is doubtful ſhou'd be conſtrued in his Favour.

If after all the Man be Tardy, let us however ſuſpend his Sentence. Is it the firſt Fault? His paſt good Deeds may atone for it. Is it Weakneſs? We may be

be overcome our ſelves. Is it not to be defended? Let his Repentance diſarm our Anger. Thus may a Wiſe Man convert that into Nouriſhment, which wou'd be Poyſon to the Vulgar. What overturns a weak-built Correſpondence, ſerves but to ſettle his. Forgiving the Fault makes a new Obligation to cement their Friendſhip. It will inſpire the one to keep up the Kindneſs, the other to ſhew he deſerv'd it.

The greater Reaſon have we to be upon our Guard againſt this External Force, becauſe it is like to be joyn'd from within. Self-love is apt to create new Stratagems to confound and ruin Friendſhip, which are therefore dangerous, becauſe hardly perceiv'd. Naturally we love and eſteem our ſelves above all others. This Principle in Vicious Perſons is the Root of all Diſorder; but corrected by Reaſon, is the Spring of all Virtuous Actions. The inbred Value we have for our ſelves carries us to deſpiſe others, and to make our ſelves ridiculous: But this Principle regulated and improv'd, makes us careful of our Conduct, that we may look upon our ſelves with Satisfaction. Our Brutal Self-love ſets every one for

for himſelf, without caring what becomes of his Neighbours. But Cultivated by Reaſon, gives every Man his due; and makes Men Generous out of a Principle of Intereſt, as they are like to receive the Meaſure they give. So that to deſire a Man ſhou'd wholly ſtrip himſelf of Self-love is no more neceſſary than practicable; ſince to eſteem our ſelves upon a juſt Foundation, is the ſame thing as to be Wiſe and Reaſonable.

Self-love, without this Regulation, is a Reſtiff Principle, with which one muſt be at perpetual defiance if a Friendſhip thrive and flouriſh; it will otherwiſe eat up all the ſtrength of our Alliances. You expect from your Friend all that you reckon is your due. Your Notion perhaps of what is due is extended farther than it ſhou'd, and conſequently you demand more than your Right. Whence it comes to paſs, that having eſtabliſh'd Rules for your Friend to be govern'd by, all that he denies you look upon as unjuſt, and lay it to Heart; whereas the Man, it may be, has no ſuch Notion of the Matter. He may not know your Rules, or may not think himſelf obliged to ſo much. And the next ſtep is to take your Complaints for

for Unreaſonable. Hence proceeds Coldneſs, next Miſunderſtandings, and then the League breaks. One Friend thinks t'other unwilling to do his Part; t'other is inflamed that ſo much of the Burthen ſhou'd be laid upon him. One expects a great deal of Complaiſance; t'other grutches what he ſees no return of. We can't bear Contradiction. Every one wou'd have his Way and his Will. One wou'd have things adjuſted by his Fancy, t'other by his.

The only way to prevent this, is to labour after an Equality in our Judgment. To give the Meaſure we take, and flatter our ſelves no more than we do others. You think much to be thwarted; and has not your Friend as much reaſon to diſlike it? In Matters Indifferent we take up Opinions as we pleaſe: But it's a thing of ill Precedent, and makes us Dogmatical in greater things. What is there that can juſtifie our Impatience? What is there to be ſaid for one ſide more than for the other? My Friend, I preſume, is in the wrong; he thinks, and perhaps more juſtly, the ſame of me. He's too much Conceited, ſo may I be. He's too Violent and Poſitive, let your Remedy be abundant

abundant Humility and Moderation.

Your Friend, it may be, has fail'd in his Diligence, and his Zeal too, in ſome Affair or other; will you ſay you never did ſo your ſelf? You expected more at his Hands, when, perhaps, that was more than your own Practice, impartially conſider'd, cou'd challenge in return. If he was wanting here, ſome other time he has outdone Expectation. Be ſo juſt to ſet one againſt t'other. He ſtaid for asking, when he might have foreſeen his Service wou'd be acceptable; did you never do the like? He neglected your Buſineſs, which another Man wou'd have done better; but does he manage his own Matters to more Advantage? If not, Condemn your own Choice, rather than the Failings of your Friend: Or conſider whether in his Caſe you have not been as careleſs.

Look upon the good Offices you receive as Gifts; upon thoſe you do as Debts. Excuſe what you are not able to Juſtifie. What can't be Juſtified, Forgive. A ſweet and Indulgent Temper is hardeſt to diſoblige: But when we impoſe upon that Goodneſs, we have more to reproach our ſelves of, than if the Man were

were Haſty and Perverſe. This Method may fright People with its Difficulty; but we may find our Accompt in it, as it's the only Way to maintain a good Underſtanding, and firm Union, amongſt Friends.

Of all the things that break it off, the moſt diſmal is a total Revolt of the Affections, which we call a Blackneſs of the Heart. When a Man is willingly carried into Acts of Unkindneſs. There's a great Difference between a falſe ſtep, and a Reſolution to perſiſt in doing ill. The Law, it's true, takes hold of any ſingle Offence, but Equity diſtinguiſhes between that and the Habit. The one is to be deteſted, t'other only lamented.

When ſuch a miſerable Change happens in any Breaſt, the Bonds of Friendſhip muſt burſt of courſe. When Honour and Conſcience are overborne by Spleen and Malice, that which was an Adherent, and a Creature of Virtue, muſt bid farewel. Yet are not our good Offices to be all extinguiſh'd by the moſt fatal Accident that can happen; there are ſome remains of Kindneſs behind. If to a Perſon juſtly diſgraced we owe no Service which wou'd give a Countenance to his Crime, we ſhou'd yet pay our Reſpect

ſpect to the expiring Friendſhip. We ſhou'd afford him all Aſſiſtance and Relief, and not deſert him in Diſtreſs. Such a Severity wou'd be taken, and with reaſon too, for a Pretence to ſave our Labour; tho' after all the kind Treatment we ſhou'd afford him in Miſery, we can do no leſs than break off the Correſpondence for ever. To take Vice into Union with Virtue, is an Abſurdity in its ſelf. We are to remember our Obligation to a Virtuous Engagement, and not proſtitute its Honour to Weakneſs and fooliſh Pity, but leave him to the Puniſhment of Shame and Remorſe: But this is a Courſe to be taken only when the Caſe is deſperate. Every Failing in one's Duty is not to be interpreted Contumacy. We are not to give a Friend over till all Remedies have been tried to reduce him. Our Patience ſhou'd hold out till the laſt, till tender Counſels and ſevere Reproaches have been ineffectual; till Example, Honour, and Diſgrace, have been ſet before him, and enforced by all the Rhetorick a ſincere Intention can furniſh.

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To abandon a Man in Error, is like forſaking him in Miſery. 'Tis one of the Eſſential Obligations of Friendſhip to reſtore him, if poſſible. 'Tis the Part of Humane Nature to fall, and the Part of Friendſhip to help him up. To let him periſh for want of our Aſſiſtance, were little leſs than to trample upon him. We may diſtinguiſh between the Perſon and the Vice; and Affection to One will engage us more violently againſt the Other. We may Support That while we Attack This: But if we cannot part 'em, we have no more to do but get off from the Contagion, or at leaſt the Scandal, of ſuch Acquaintance. An Alliance with Vice cannot be otherwiſe conſtrued, than Aiding and Abetting it. It will give too much colour for the World to call us Hypocrites.

As this Severity of caſting off Friends is not to be practiced but upon due Conſideration, and abſolute Neceſſity, as when we part with a Limb to prevent a Gangrene; we muſt be ſure to let Paſſion have nothing to do in the Matter, either in the Reſolution before, or Management afterwards. Some People are apt to aggravate Matters, and inſtead of ſub-

ſubduing their Indignation at the Follies of a Friend, take fire immediately, and throw him off. They Appeal to the World to judge of their Conduct: Whereas this is to violate the Rights of Friendſhip, to bring that upon the Publick Stage which none but our own Breaſt ſhou'd take Cognizance of. And what comes of it at laſt? We make a Man a Thouſand Enemies for an Offence committed againſt one ſingle Perſon: And for our ſelves we loſe more Credit by it generally than we get. Each Party has ſome Friends who will take their ſide, and each ſome Enemies that will be glad of an Opportunity to blacken him. The World is not ſo good-natur'd that a Wiſe Man wou'd venture his Cauſe (as juſt as he apprehends it) to their Candid determination. There's Faults no doubt on both ſides, ſays the Multitude: If One has been to Blame, T'other has been too Severe. If One has been Ungrateful, T'other expected more than his Due.

One wou'd avoid the Cenſure of Mankind, eſpecially where ſome Blame may be juſtly charged upon us. Decency requires the Caſe ſhou'd be privately Argued, and forbids an open Rupture: If our

our own Credit, and Compaſſion to our Friend, did not exact it of us. Let the Engagement go fairly off. After the Affections have been ſo intimately united, there's no parting 'em on a ſudden, but by injuring both. Tho' the Inſide be altered, there's no neceſſity of publiſhing it in the Market-place. The Correſpondence ſhou'd diſappear by degrees, and the World will take leſs notice of it. *Friendſhip*, ſays *Cato*, *ſhou'd be Unſtitch'd, not Unripp'd.* Our Behaviour afterwards ſhou'd be agreeable. As we don't Proclaim the Rupture, no more ſhou'd we be making Publick Defences of it. Can't we leave off being Friends, without ſetting up for Enemies? In Publick Company there's no need of ſhewing our Diſguſt; nor of being pleaſed to hear of a Man's Ingratitude to others, becauſe he has done ill by us. If Friendſhip has no preſent Power, yet its Memory has a reſpect owing to it. To what purpoſe are theſe Things the Subject of Converſation? The Man hath been Vicious or Unfaithful, what have the World to do with that? If his Circumſtances be low, or afterwards ſink, this will paſs for a Poli-

tick falling out, becauſe we foreſaw his Acquaintance wou'd be troubleſome.

Revenge, which is never to be indulg'd, is here moſt of all a Crime, and yet will creep in under the diſguiſe of Juſtice: As if the Rights of Friendſhip once violated, there were nothing to be thought of but Severity to repair its Honour. And here the eaſineſs of Revenge may egg us on. We know the Man to the bottom, and can do him Miſchief a Hundred Ways; but this is Inhumane. All we can honourably allow our ſelves in, is to ſhew, by a Genteel Behaviour, what he has loſt that has forfeited our Friendſhip; by our own Generous Conduct to diſcover the Faults of his, and make him ſuffer in the Reproaches of his own Breaſt. Beſides that, Civility is a Point of Juſtice due to Strangers, Antecedent to any Engagement; and what Friendſhip never gave, the Violation of it can't take away. To be unconcern'd at his Misfortunes, or Succeſs, to look upon him with the Averſion of an Enemy, is Paſſion, and not juſt Reſentment. His betraying your Secrets will not juſtifie you in expoſing his. You'll meet with a more favourable O-

pinion

pinion from the beſt Men, while you are ſo Generous to Suffer rather than Retaliate. Whereas they'll think you deſerv'd ſuch Uſage, if you can allow it in your ſelf. This is not properly puniſhing, but confirming Men in what they do amiſs, to do like 'em. If you follow the Example, what Right have you to find fault with it? If you find fault, what Right have you to follow it?

But you'll ſay this were the Way to lay every good Man at the Mercy of thoſe that wou'd abuſe him, if Repriſals of this kind are forbidden. Puniſhment is but neceſſary for a Terror to others: But then let it alone for thoſe in Authority: T'other is repelling Force by Force. We have no longer need of Publick Courts if every one is to do himſelf Juſtice. He firſt determines in his own Caſe, and then puts his Sentence in Execution. This by degrees undermines Civil Society. It reſolves all Authority into Strength, and juſtifies Oppreſſion when it can defie the Law.

But this is a Matter the Law takes no notice of. A breach of Truſt may be as much an Injury to me as deny-

ing his Hand and Seal. And ſhall I have no Remedy at all? This ſhou'd have been thought of before you contracted your Friendſhip. There's no Relief but Patience. Admitting it otherwiſe, you open a Door to all manner of Diſorder. Friendſhip has no Sting to revenge Affronts with. The Remorſe which a guilty Perſon feels, and the Diſgrace he meets with abroad, if his Character be known, is the Puniſhment we muſt content our ſelves with inflicting.

Amongſt the Friends we may ſhake off, I reckon thoſe who ſtick cloſe as long as Fortune is kind, but turn with the Tide, and keep at diſtance. Thoſe Flies that follow the Honey-pot while there's ſomething to be had, and take leave when there's no more to be hoped for. A true Friend may be forgiven, if in time of Proſperity he ſeem forgetful of you; but he's not worth having that neglects you in Diſtreſs: For 'tis then his Duty comes on when things go againſt you. To Suſtain and Comfort you when you are oppreſs'd with Trouble, and bear a part of your Burthen. We think we come up to the

the higheſt pitch of Friendſhip, when our Purſe is open to our Friend. It's true, comparatively reckoning, he's a Generous Man that will do ſo much; but that is not enough. I ſhall never forget what I heard a Lady ſay upon the Subject; ſhe was one that was a Credit to her Sex for her Greatneſs of Soul, as well as Vivacity of Wit. *There's nothing* (ſaid ſhe) *that Diſparages our Age more, than the mighty wonder we make to ſee a Man free of what he has to his Friends.* If to part with our Money to thoſe we profeſs an Affection for be the higheſt degree of Friendſhip, pray what muſt the loweſt be? Is it ſuch a mighty buſineſs to do that for the deareſt Perſon in the World, which we do to gratifie a vain Humour? What Common Humanity or Applauſe will put us upon, ſurely amongſt Friends is not to be reckon'd an Act of Tranſcendent Kindneſs, when it is no more than giving to Another Self, and paying of Debts. Is there any thing more certainly a Due than what we are engag'd to by Alliance of Friendſhip? Let a Man incurr the Diſpleaſure of Great Folks, venture Life and Fortune in my Ser-

vice, I'll own ſuch a Man to be a Friend indeed, Generous and Affectionate; one can't praiſe him too much. Let him open his Purſe to one he loves, this comes ſhort of the other. A Man of Honour upon a ſlender Friendſhip wou'd do as much as this: To cry up the parting with our Pence for the higheſt Sacrifice can be made to Friendſhip, is a ſign of a Groveling Spirit, that knows not what is truly Noble. The People of old had better Notions of the Matter, who wou'd borrow to give others in Diſtreſs, and think they had done no more than their Duty.

He that fails in this Point, is not worth our Acquaintance. He that deſerts a Man to ſave his Pocket, will never hazard Life and Reputation in his Service. Virtue is the Principle of Union; but Vice is often ſtrong enough to make a Separation. Adverſity is the time to try how ſincere the Profeſſions were, if they paſs that Teſt, we may depend upon 'em.

When a Friend has paſs'd all the ſeveral Proofs of Proſperous and Adverſe Fortune, and approv'd himſelf unalte-

unalterably ours; when ſuch a One comes to be taken off by Death, it cannot but deeply affect us. So bitter is the loſs of him we were ſo nearly Allied to; we are apt to think it had been better for us never to have known him. Every thing that was delightful is buried with him. Nature ſeems to have chang'd her Face, and all things to have put on Mourning.

All that our Fancy preſents is diſmal. Our other Enjoyments are all become Inſipid. In vain are our own, or other Peoples Endeavours to divert our Grief. If it be put off for the preſent, it returns with greater Vehemence, and nothing takes Place but the Sence of our Loſs. In our Midnight Ravings we imagine him alive again; and when perfectly awake muſt fall from that Enjoyment. We frequent the Places where we uſe to have his Company, and this renews our Sorrow. Solitude is moſt acceptable to us. If any Friend be admitted, 'tis one that inſtead of condemning our Weakneſs, does but nouriſh and indulge it. None but thoſe that have experienc'd what I ſay can believe it.

A Man's Heart may be as ſenſible as another's, and his Imagination as quick, but he can't come up to the Life.

I confeſs, it were too ſevere the condemning ſo juſt a Paſſion. Nature has not made us Stones, to maintain an Indifference when we are Rack'd either in Mind or Body: But yet 'tis Unmanly to follow it into Exceſs. We are Virtuous when we are ſo as far as Humane Nature will bear; and we are Vicious when we give our ſelves up to Paſſion, which Reaſon might ſubdue.

It's hard to keep Grief within its due Bounds, to confine it to Reaſon and Decency, and give a check to it when it grows Extravagant. The ſafeſt Method is to indulge it as little as may be. Tho' after all, Nature has its Rights which Philoſophy can't controul. Experience will convince us their Precepts fail through too great Severity. When they overdo they have leaſt Succeſs. We may allow ſomething to Nature, and indulge the firſt Motions of the Heart. A reſiſtance ſo ill-timed will be in vain; but when Nature has had its Turn, 'tis fit Reaſon

ſhou'd

ſhou'd come in for its Share: And Reaſon will tell us, 'tis not Noiſie Mourning for the Dead that ſhews us to be their Friends, but remembring them in our Services to thoſe they have left behind. A Wiſe Man may drop ſome Tears at his Friend's Grave, but 'tis Weakneſs to pour 'em out without Meaſure. It has been the Obſervation of ſome, The more appearance of Sorrow, the leſs Reality; that the Heart is eaſie when it vents it ſelf ſo abundantly at the Cheeks. This is a little too ſevere. It's true, the leſs Noiſe the better, if we can command our Paſſions. 'Tis certainly want of Manly Reſolution that betrays us into theſe Indecencies. Great Souls can expreſs their Grief better than by running into the Extravagancies of Childhood and Dotage.

Giving way to Sorrow is a thing Vain and Unprofitable; and therefore if they are ſurprized into an Exceſs, their own Reflections ſoon ſet 'em right again. A Wiſe Man when the firſt Clouds of Sorrow are blown over and diſpers'd, inſtead of Paſſion, takes part with Reaſon; well knowing, that

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to indulge Grief, is Unjuſt to himſelf, Injurious to others, and perfectly Uſeleſs to the Deceaſed it's laid out upon: Why ſhou'd any Man waſte and conſume himſelf with weeping? Why ſhou'd he aggravate one Misfortune by another? There's a Duty incumbent on us to our Family, and our Country, which upon no account is to be diſpens'd with. Leaſt of all for Preposſeſſions of Impertinence, and a contracted habit of Whining. There's more Sloth, after all, in the Matter than Reſpect. 'Tis eaſier to be carry'd down the Stream, than to reſiſt it. And therefore an Effeminate Weakneſs puts on the Specious Diſguiſe of Affection and Gratitude.

And then for others that are our Friends too, muſt a pretended reſpect to one ſwallow up all that's due to the reſt? Muſt all the Pains they take to conſole us, and make up our Loſs by new Profeſſions of their Service and Fidelity, be ſlighted? If we had any regard to the Eaſe and Welfare of thoſe we wou'd be thought Friends to, we ſhou'd ſpare 'em all the Regret they ſuffer upon our Subject. And

give

give up our affected Demonſtrations of Grief to cure theirs; which proceeds upon a better Foundation, as it laments what may be remedied, whereas our own is a fruitleſs Paſſion. Nor is it barely an Affront, but may be a real Injury, to 'em. We neglect all thoſe Offices their Circumſtances may require at our Hands. We are fit for none of the Duties of Friendſhip when under a *Delirium* of Paſſion. Nor even after we are come to our Senſes can we with Decency diſcharge our ſelves upon the Subject of Immoderate Grief in others, from a Senſe of our own Licentious Example.

And where at laſt is the Advantage of this ſullen Reſpect? It can be no more to the Dead than to the Living. It were ſomething indeed to Sacrifice our Life to defend his; but to throw it away without proſpect of any Service to him, is a Child's Revenge; like breaking his Knuckles againſt a Poſt for ſtanding in his Way. If your Tears wou'd again Leaven his Aſhes, and reſtore him to Life, ſomething might be ſaid. As it is, we do but Imitate the barbarouſly kind *Indian*

dian Wives, who (as Travellers ſay) are buried alive with their dead Huſbands. If their Affection cou'd be drawn into a narrower Compaſs, ſo as to be all enjoy'd by their Dear Husbands whilſt they lived, it were no matter if it expired when it can be of no farther uſe. To ſay no more; wou'd your Friend, if he cou'd know the Methods you take to expreſs your Concern, the Sacrifices you make to his Memory, take this well at your Hands? Wou'd not he rather blame an unneceſſary Expence of Paſſion, which might be better employ'd in the Care of his ſurviving Family?

But muſt we then let him go without ſhewing that we valued him? Muſt Our Behaviour at his Funeral give occaſion to ſuſpect our Affection? No; no Body demands ſuch a Stoical Indifference as this. You may ſhew a decent Regret. Nay, you are indulged in the ſweetneſs of a ſhort Melancholy, in yielding to the firſt Impetuous Motions of the Heart: But remember, to fulfil the Will of the Dead is but Juſtice, and that muſt be in ſubduing an Irregular and Deſtructive Paſſion.

So

So far as your Thoughts can be of Service to perpetuate his Memory, and deliver his Virtuous Example to the World, Reaſon and Reſpect allow you. Give Poſterity, if you pleaſe, the Picture of ſo Great a Man, and ſo Good a Friend. You may expreſs a Senſe of his Perfections, and inform the World by doing ſo. There is ſomething of Credit juſtly attain'd by ſuch a Method: But as this is not every Body's Talent, we may take occaſions of mentioning the Dead in our Diſcourſe. We may keep up the Idea of him in Pictures, and other Things. We may take a Pleaſure in extolling his Virtues, his Wit, and Good Humour; and all this without Noiſie Expreſſions of Grief. Which if one may uſe the liberty of diving into Peoples Hearts, ſeems to be rather from a Motive of Pride, that we may let the World ſee how Dear we were to the Deceaſed, and that Dearneſs muſt proceed from the Reaſon he had to value us.

If we ſigh ſo abundantly when our Friend is ſpoken of, every Body will be ſhy of mentioning him. The Diſcourſe will be diverted, for fear of throwing

throwing us into Convulſions. Thoſe that love us will put it off out of Kindneſs to us; thoſe that do not love us, out of Kindneſs to themſelves; for ſuch Entertainment will be diſagreeable. So that the Memory of your Friend muſt be Becalm'd; you'll have no Body to talk with about him. He'll be forgot for want of that due Temper you ſhou'd obſerve when you ſpeak of him. Inſtead of keeping his Virtues in Remembrance, you'll bury them after him in your Unreaſonable Sadneſs.

Wou'd you ſhew a Prudent Concern for your Friend? Make others concern'd at the Loſs of him. Take every occaſion to ſpeak of his Merit, and give him his due of Honour. If there be any thing you owe to his Pains or Example, let him have the Credit of the Improvement. And inſtead of your own, give his Judgment of Things if it was the ſame with yours. In ſhort, let the World know, when it comes in your Way, how much he deſerv'd in the Eyes of them that knew him beſt. There is a Way to Remember a Friend which does it

better

better than Sighs and Groans. It's true, I ſhall meet with few will follow my Rule; but that ſhall not diſcourage my mentioning it, ſince we are ſhewing, not what Friends uſually are, but what they ſhou'd be: And that is to put our ſelves in his Place, and ſupply his Part now he's out of the Way. 'Tis reckoned a mighty Performance faithfully to diſcharge a Legal Truſt, and do Juſtice to the Dead: But Friendſhip commits a Man's Intereſt to our Truſt, tho' without Penalty upon our Failures. And this Truſt is of a more extenſive Nature, taking in all Perſons and Occaſions of doing good Offices for the ſake of him that's gone. We look upon him to be Generous that defends the Memory of his Friend when it is aſſaulted by Malice and the like: But he deſerves the Character better that ſeeks Opportunities of continuing his Service, that creates 'em when they don't fall in his Way.

For Inſtance, His Widow, his Children, his Faithful Servants, ſhall find in you a Husband, a Father, and a Maſter; your Good Offices, your Advice, your Protection, may be of uſe to

to 'em, and you may ſupply their Loſs, and this with all the readineſs in the World, whether they have any Perſonal Merit or not. There want of us is all that's to be conſider'd; not our Inclination, but our Obligation, to our Friend. We ſhou'd not ſtay to be ask'd; and when we are, make Shams and Excuſes to put them off, as is the Way of the World, but find out wherein we may be Serviceable, and put them upon making Free with us. We have enjoy'd the Sweets of Friendſhip, 'tis fit we ſhew our Gratitude when we expect no return. We may take it for a Rule, to do that for his Family (as far as our Ability reaches) which we wou'd have done if he'd been alive, that they may find they have not loſt, but only changed, a Benefactor. Thus inſtead of pouring our own Tears upon the Ground, we may dry up thoſe of his Relations, and expreſs a real Reſpect, which Hired Mourners cannot outdo us in.

It looks like a Mercenary Deſign, to break off, or ſo much as to leſſen, our Services at the Death of a Friend.

It

It betrays a Vulgar Spirit of Weakneſs to lay our ſelves out in unactive Sorrow. When Friendſhip is turn'd to a Shade, like thoſe the Heathens fancy'd upon the *Stygian* Shore, paſſing their Time without Benefit to others, or Enjoyment to themſelves.

Death is in Truth the only certain Touchſtone of Friendſhip. Adverſity does much; It Sacrifices a preſent Intereſt; but who knows but this may be ſometimes to make Friends againſt a Rainy Day? When Fortune, conſtant in her Fickleneſs, may ſet us or ours as much the Object of another's Kindneſs: But Death is the ſure Criterion of Fidelity, when Hope and Fear have loſt their Force, and there's room for only Generous Motives. Thoſe that have an Honourable Senſe of Friendſhip, will find it harder to forgive themſelves any Neglect of their Friend's Surviving Relations, than of himſelf. Whilſt he lives he is in a Condition to ſupply what they fail in. If we may be excuſed for Sleeping when he is Awake, yet we can't acquit our ſelves for not Watching when he is Aſleep.

In the Reflections I have made, I don't pretend to have Treated ſo Great a Subject as it deſerves. I have given in a Rough Draught my Notion of Friendſhip, without imagining I have done it Juſtice. Rules of Morality, which proceed upon Principles already known, are not always the moſt Taking. There may perhaps be expected ſome New Exalted Ideas in a Buſineſs of this Nature; whereas here's nothing but the Obvious Reſult of Common Reaſon, which makes the Thing leſs liable to Exceptions.

I may be charged with Conſtituting Friendſhip in an Artful Behaviour, which ſhou'd be the Genuine Motion of the Heart; but without Reaſon. For I don't bring Rules to Create Inclination, but to Direct and Improve it. I don't go about to inſtill the Faculty of Loving, but only the Regulation of it. And if I cou'd come up to my Deſign, I ſhou'd do great Service to Morality; to Advance a Correſpondence ſo beneficial to Mankind, as Friendſhip founded in Reaſon and Virtue. My Endeavour has been to reduce ſome Out-lying Pretenders to the

the Honourable Character. By explaining the Nature of Friendſhip, I wou'd prevent Peoples Miſtakes; by propoſing its Advantage, wou'd encourage them to Embrace it; by mentioning its Obligation, wou'd engage 'em to Diſcharge it.

THE END.

ERRATA.

PAge 7. line 13. for *beſt* read *Leaſt*. p. 11. l. 3. after *Will* inſert *It*. p. 13. l. 2. inſtead of (?) r. (.) l. 20. after *Will* inſert *be*. p. 21. l. 27. for *One* r. *One's*. p. 24. l. 24. for *Regeneration* r. *Generation*. p. 28. l. 8. before *make* inſert *to*. p. 29. l. 11. for *expreſſes* r. *expreſs*. p. 33. l. 5. put the Comma after *Downward*, p. 51. l. 28. for *Aimable* r. *Amiable*. p. 54. l. 5. for *which has* r. *have*. p. 56. l. 21. for *'tis* r. *lies*. p. 82. l. 19. for (?) make (.) p. 15. l. 2. for *Charles* r. *Philip*. p. 115. l. 19. for *True* r. *Due*. p. 160. l. 4. for *There* r. *Their*.

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